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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose your company wants to engage young people 
through social media, building your brand among thousands of 
potential customers in an effective and relatively inexpensive 
manner. You learn that a photographer has snapped a picture of 
a popular celebrity leaving your store, shopping bags with your 
logo in hand. Excited by this opportunity to improve your brand, 
your company posts the photograph on social media. Three days 
later, you have a lawsuit on your hands. 
If this sounds far-fetched, think again. Lawsuits have pro-
liferated in recent years as celebrities have claimed violations of 
their statutory and common-law rights when companies post 
pictures on social media. Plaintiffs ranging from Katherine 
Heigl to Humphrey Bogart’s estate have filed lawsuits against 
companies after the companies posted the celebrities’ pictures on 
social media.1 However, none of these suits has come to judg-
ment, instead settling privately before trial,2 which provides lit-
tle guidance to potential defendants, plaintiffs, and judges. 
 
 † BA 2011, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2016, The University of 
Chicago Law School. 
 1 See generally Complaint, Heigl v Duane Reade, Inc, Civil Action No 14-2502 
(SDNY filed Apr 9, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 1383558) (“Heigl Com-
plaint”); Complaint, Bogart LLC v Burberry Group, PLC, Civil Action No 12-04491 (CD 
Cal filed May 31, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 2911856). For another exam-
ple of a suit that included use of social media, see Ben Child, Sandra Bullock Settles 
Lawsuit with Watchmaker over Use of Her Name (The Guardian, May 21, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/W4XZ-QMDU. 
 2 See Nate Raymond, Katherine Heigl, Duane Reade End Lawsuit over Actress’ 
Photo (Reuters, Aug 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/432K-HVEQ; Bill Donahue, 
Burberry Makes Peace in Humphrey Bogart Image Battle (Law360, Aug 1, 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/VK44-49TG.  
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Social media is an increasingly common and effective tool for 
companies to reach consumers. Most companies use social me-
dia—83 percent of Fortune 500 companies have corporate Twitter 
accounts and 80 percent use Facebook.3 In 2015, companies were 
projected to spend over $23.6 billion worldwide on social media 
advertising.4 More importantly, this investment can generate 
immense returns. A recent study found that each Facebook post 
made by large companies generated, on average, over 24,000 
“likes”5 from consumers and 350 positive, consumer-written 
comments.6 Another study found that the presence of Facebook 
“likes” can increase sales by almost 13 percent for online retail-
ers.7 User comments and posts are also valuable. For example, 
each time a Ticketmaster user posts that she is considering at-
tending an event, Ticketmaster receives an average of $5.30 in 
direct sales from that post.8 
Even a single post can have a massive impact, especially if 
it involves a celebrity. Samsung signed baseball player David 
Ortiz as an “MLB social media insider” (a form of endorsement 
deal) the day before Ortiz visited the White House to celebrate 
his team’s World Series win.9 While at the celebration, Ortiz 
took a “selfie”10 of himself with President Barack Obama and 
posted it to his Twitter account.11 Shortly thereafter, Samsung 
started using the picture as a “promoted post”12 on Twitter, while 
 
 3 Nora Ganim Barnes and Ava M. Lescault, The 2014 Fortune 500 and Social Me-
dia: LinkedIn Dominates as Use of Newer Tools Explodes (University of Massachusetts 
Dartmouth, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LYR5-FNPT. 
 4 Social Network Ad Spending to Hit $23.68 Billion Worldwide in 2015 (eMarket-
er, Apr 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/W6Y4-WDRT. 
 5 Facebook allows a user to “[c]lick[ ] Like below a post on Facebook . . . to let peo-
ple know that [she] enjoy[s] it without leaving a comment.” Like (Facebook), archived at 
http://perma.cc/E8YU-9XB7. 
 6 Thomas Aichner and Frank Jacob, Measuring the Degree of Corporate Social Me-
dia Use, 57 Intl J Mkt Rsrch 257, 267 (2015). 
 7 Facebook Recommendations Could Be Worth Millions of Euros (Johannes Gutenberg 
Universität Mainz, June 3, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/D8UN-3EVD. 
 8 Danny Sullivan, By the Numbers: How Facebook Says Likes & Social Plugins Help 
Websites (Search Engine Land, May 22, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/YMW9-4KR2. 
 9 Mark Bergen, Samsung Swings for Another Selfie Home Run (Advertising Age, 
Apr 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PE34-WSMD. 
 10 A “selfie” is a “photograph that one has taken of oneself, typically one taken with 
a smartphone or webcam and shared via social media.” Selfie (Oxford Dictionaries), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/RX2D-6ZNY. 
 11 Bergen, Samsung Swings for Another Selfie Home Run (cited in note 9). 
 12 A “promoted post” is one in which the author pays Twitter to show the post to 
more people than would normally see it. Chuck Frey, How to Do Paid Promotion on 
Twitter the Right Way (Content Marketing Institute, Apr 28, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M4MW-DSU9. 
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another Samsung corporate account shared the photo and told 
fans it was taken with a Galaxy Note 3, a type of Samsung 
phone.13 As of October 19, 2015, the original photo had been “re-
tweeted” 40,417 times and “favorited” 46,721 times.14 When Sam-
sung orchestrated a similar stunt with comedian Ellen DeGeneres 
at the 2014 Oscars, involving a photo with actors Meryl Streep, 
Bradley Cooper, and Jennifer Lawrence, the tweet became 
known as the “tweet heard ‘round the world,”15 with nearly three 
million accounts retweeting the photograph (and millions more 
viewing it) within the first day.16 This form of marketing works; 
after the DeGeneres photo was posted, Samsung was mentioned 
about nine hundred times per minute on social media.17 
Given this staggering potential, it is no surprise that com-
panies are using social media despite the high risk of litigation 
and the lack of any judicial opinions to guide their use. This 
Comment provides guidance to companies wishing to take ad-
vantage of the benefits of social media without incurring liabil-
ity. Although the few cases filed in court have settled, leaving 
companies with undisclosed bills18 and legal uncertainty about 
social media, a few simple behaviors on the part of companies 
could protect them from liability. This Comment is organized as 
follows: Part I provides background on the basics of social me-
dia. It describes common social media platforms, illustrates the 
corporate profit-boosting opportunities presented by social me-
dia, and explains why celebrity lawsuits represent a significant 
problem for companies. Part I also details Heigl’s lawsuit 
against Duane Reade over posts using her photograph. Part II 
gives an overview of two key claims—the federal Lanham Act19 
and the state law right of publicity—and discusses First 
Amendment defenses that can be applied to these claims. Part 
 
 13 Bergen, Samsung Swings for Another Selfie Home Run (cited in note 9). 
 14 David Ortiz, What an Honor! (Twitter, Apr 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Q5RC-PCKL. 
 15 See, for example, Wayne Pacelle, The Tweet Heard ‘Round the World (Huffington 
Post, May 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2C2Y-P6A3. 
 16 Suzanne Vranica, Behind the Preplanned Oscar Selfie: Samsung’s Ad Strategy 
(Wall St J, Mar 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/X9SM-MKAZ; Michael Fleischman, 
The Reach and Impact of Oscars 2014 Tweets (Twitter, Mar 5, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/96BE-5KXK. 
 17 Vranica, Behind the Preplanned Oscar Selfie (cited in note 16). 
 18 In the Heigl case, for example, Duane Reade agreed to make an undisclosed do-
nation to Heigl’s animal-welfare foundation. Raymond, Katherine Heigl, Duane Reade 
End Lawsuit (cited in note 2). 
 19 Pub L No 79-489, 60 Stat 427 (1946), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1051 et seq. 
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III then details specific aspects of these claims (nickname pro-
tection and the definition of advertising) and defenses (the pub-
lic interest) that are most relevant to social media. Finally, Part 
IV discusses how the structure of social media provides opportu-
nities for companies to post photographs without violating the 
Lanham Act or the right of publicity. Specifically, Part IV first 
explains how avoiding the use of certain usernames and linking 
devices can prevent liability. It further discusses how another 
feature of social media—sharing—can be used to bolster a First 
Amendment public-interest defense for shared images. If han-
dled correctly, social media posts of celebrity photographs can be 
an effective means of engaging fans without generating liability. 
I.  SOCIAL MEDIA BACKGROUND 
A basic understanding of social media and its uses is inte-
gral to understanding its potential and its pitfalls. The first so-
cial media website was launched in 1997 and attracted millions 
of users.20 Social media websites allowing people to connect with 
friends, make new professional connections, and locate poten-
tial romantic partners popped up in the next several years.21 
Although social media was available beginning in the late 
1990s, lawsuits involving social media websites did not begin 
until the mid-2000s.22 In recent years, privacy claims have be-
gun to proliferate.23 However, Lanham Act and right of publicity 
cases are still in their infancy when it comes to social media. 
Before this Comment dives into that law, this Part explains 
how social media works. Part I.A provides a primer on social 
media, including common platforms, terminology, and struc-
tures. Part I.B explains the differences between conventional 
media and social media and why it is important for companies to 
 
 20 See danah m. boyd and Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, Histo-
ry, and Scholarship, 13 J Computer-Mediated Commun 210, 211–14 (2007) (defining so-
cial network sites “as web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public 
or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system”).  
 21 See id. 
 22 One of the earliest social media lawsuits was over the ownership of the software 
code used to create social media websites. See generally Google, Inc v Affinity Engines, 
Inc, 2005 WL 2007888 (ND Cal). Another early case was a 2007 antitrust lawsuit against 
MySpace. See generally LiveUniverse, Inc v MySpace, Inc, 2007 WL 6865852 (CD Cal). 
 23 See, for example, In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, 791 F Supp 2d 705, 708 (ND 
Cal 2011) (involving a suit against Facebook for alleged violations of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act and breach of contract, among other claims). 
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maintain a social media presence. Part I.C explains the signifi-
cance of celebrity social media suits and how company behaviors 
are affected by the surrounding legal uncertainty. Finally, Part 
I.D gives an example of a recent social media case: movie star 
Heigl’s suit against drugstore Duane Reade. 
A. Social Media 
“Social media is a broad term incorporating blogs, wikis, In-
ternet communities and online discussions” including websites 
like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter.24 In the con-
text of this Comment, “social media” refers to websites on which 
people (“users”) make accounts and then connect their accounts 
to others’ accounts. The act of connection is called “following,” 
and a user who connects to another user’s account is called a 
“follower.”25 Users can also create posts, which may include text, 
pictures, videos, or some combination thereof. These posts are 
labeled differently from website to website—on Facebook they 
are “statuses”26 while on Twitter they are “tweets”27—but they 
are all essentially the same thing. Other users can comment on 
these posts to reply to the original user and can share28 the post 
with their followers. Each user has a home page or “feed” on 
which she sees recent posts from the users she follows, as well 
as a profile page on which other users can see the content she 
has posted or shared.29 Companies and celebrities can also create 
accounts (which users can follow) and can use these accounts to 
make posts.30 Corporate accounts are popular; approximately 70 
 
 24 Bob Franklin, et al, Key Concepts in Public Relations 200 (Sage 2009). 
 25 The exact language varies by site—for example, on Facebook, following is called 
“friending,” while on Twitter it is simply called “following.” See Francis McCarthy, The 7 
Rules of Facebook Friending (Thought Catalog, July 24, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5G3K-VKSL; The Twitter Glossary (Twitter), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
MZ3X-47Y2. “Following” and “followers” are used throughout this Comment because 
they are the most descriptive and least platform-specific terms. 
 26 Social Media Terminology (Two Degrees Marketing), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
SB4B-C9FT. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Sharing also has a variety of names depending on the platform, such as “retweet-
ing” on Twitter. The Twitter Glossary (cited in note 25). 
 29 See Social Media Terminology (cited in note 26). 
 30 Many corporate and celebrity accounts are managed by paid staff. See Caysey 
Welton, Social Media: An Occupation on the Rise (Infographic) (PRNews, Oct 3, 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/EQ2U-67J4. The fact that celebrity accounts are managed by 
third-party agents has not troubled courts, which tend to view the heavily managed nature 
of a celebrity’s identity and statements to still be attributed to the celebrity as a person. 
Just as the actions of a corporate social media staffer are attributed to the company as an 
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percent of active Facebook users in North America follow at 
least one business.31 
Once a person has followed another account, she will see the 
followed account’s recent posts on her home page.32 Because the 
home page is a compilation of recent posts by everyone a user 
follows, the odds of seeing any single post are relatively small. 
Facebook posts by a given company are typically seen by about 
16 percent of that company’s followers.33 To increase the number 
of people who see a given post, companies can pay the social me-
dia site to make the post a “promoted post” (on Facebook) or a 
“promoted tweet” (on Twitter).34 Companies can even target a 
given post to specific users or specific demographics (such as 
women in their twenties or men in Oklahoma).35 These posts can 
convince more people to follow the company’s account or can 
persuade them to buy a specific product.36 These paid posts ad-
vertise not only the product mentioned in the post but also the 
company’s social media account itself, encouraging users to fol-
low the account.37 This advertising is quite cost-effective. Each 
post can cost as little as $1 per new follower and lead to large in-
creases in business.38 For example, the Aria, a Las Vegas hotel, 
chose to post a deal on Facebook and paid to promote it.39 Over 
177,000 people clicked on the link and over 600 people booked 
reservations—representing a 485 percent return on Aria’s in-
vestment, according to Facebook.40 An Arizona bicycle company 
that ran a similar deal saw its sales increase by $500,000.41 
 
entity, the actions of a celebrity’s social media manager are attributed to the celebrity as 
if she wrote them herself. See Amy Kaufman, For Hollywood’s Social Media Managers, 
Tweeting Is a Living (LA Times, Nov 15, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/T7YL-R3EJ. 
 31 Lauren Drell, Can Promoted Posts Help Your Business? (Mashable, July 8, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/A8YY-KKQT. 
 32 There are ways to hide or change which accounts a user sees on her home page 
(also called a “feed”), but they are not relevant here since the default is that the accounts 
are seen. See, for example, Controlling What You See in News Feed (Facebook), archived 
at http://perma.cc/QTH7-J5RU. 
 33 Drell, Can Promoted Posts Help Your Business? (cited in note 31). 
 34 See id; Frey, How to Do Paid Promotion on Twitter (cited in note 12). 
 35 See Drell, Can Promoted Posts Help Your Business? (cited in note 31). 
 36 See id. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Sujan Patel, 12 Things You Need to Know about Social Advertising (Small Busi-
ness Trends, Oct 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6KXU-246G. 
 39 Case Study: Aria Resort and Casino (Facebook), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
E2UP-WNY4. 
 40 Id. 
 41 State Bicycle Co (Facebook), archived at http://perma.cc/9GVG-B7PF. 
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Users can employ several tools to increase the visibility of 
their posts without paying the social media site. For example, a 
user can “tag” another user by typing the “@” symbol followed by 
the person’s or company’s username.42 The post will then appear 
on the profile pages of both the tagger and the tagged user, as 
well as on their followers’ feeds.43 
Another way to increase viewership of a post is through a 
form of indexing using hashtags . A “hashtag” is a word or phrase 
(without spaces) preceded by the “#” symbol.44 Clicking a hashtag 
will bring up other posts by users who have used the same 
hashtag.45 For example, clicking on “#Ferguson” brings up posts 
related to the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, while “#snowday” brings up posts about school clos-
ings due to snow.46 Many companies and celebrities have their 
own hashtags that they use to promote their brands, services, or 
upcoming products: for example, Samsung used the hashtag 
“#TheNextBigThing” to promote its Galaxy smartphone.47 
Corporate social media functions somewhat differently than 
traditional advertising. Social media accounts can certainly aim to 
sell specific products—for example, a March 14, 2014, Twitter post 
by Duane Reade read “Crunch, crunch Munch! It’s National Potato 
Chip Day! Enjoy!” and was followed by a link to an advertisement 
 
 42 See Marissa Mele, Using Facebook’s Updated Tagging Feature to Increase Your 
Brand’s Exposure (MoreVisibility, Mar 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7CPF-QFLF. 
 43 To some extent, this is dependent on the privacy settings of the tagger and the 
tagged user, but tagging almost always leads to an increase in visibility. See Sam Blum, 
Facebook’s New Promoted-Post Feature Sparks Privacy Concerns (The Guardian, Feb 15, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/YW56-AVPL; Facebook Brand Pages Increase Visibil-
ity with Page Tagging (Starmark), archived at http://perma.cc/AA57-JSK4. 
 44 The Twitter Glossary (cited in note 25).  
 45 See id. 
 46 See #Ferguson (Twitter), archived at http://perma.cc/H3Z6-GP6G; #snowday 
(Twitter), archived at http://perma.cc/LVN3-R4ZM.  
 47 Tim Nudd, Samsung Unveils Super Bowl Ad, as LeBron James Joins Seth Rogen 
and Paul Rudd (Adweek, Feb 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3HDH-GDLK. Many 
celebrities have distinctive hashtags: actor Charlie Sheen used “#tigerbloodintern” for a 
sponsored internship campaign, and actress Christina Ricci inspired “#Riccing” for pictures 
of individuals trying to fit themselves into small spaces, while “#Eastwooding” refers to 
talking to an empty chair as actor Clint Eastwood did during the 2012 Republican National 
Convention. Jo Piazza, How Much Can a Celebrity Make for Tweeting? (Vulture, Jan 28, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/JC83-AEYJ; Dana Schuster, 5 of the Best Celebrity-
Inspired Hashtags (NY Post, Jan 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4KCE-8NXX. 
Companies get in on the act too. T-Mobile once attempted to use Verizon’s marketing 
slogan (“#NeverSettle”) against it (turning it into “#NeverSettleforVerizon”), although 
the advertising campaign was withdrawn after backlash from users. See Christopher 
Heine, T-Mobile Appears to Pull Twitter Ad after Backlash: #NeverSettleForVerizon 
Reaps Negative Tweets (Adweek, May 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XJV3-L6R4. 
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for its store brand of potato chips.48 However, companies often 
use social media to engage in building brand loyalty.49 Brand 
loyalty is “the tendency of consumers to continue buying a par-
ticular brand instead of trying a different one,” meaning that a 
customer with high brand loyalty will consume a company’s 
product even when its competitors offer similar products.50 Simi-
lar to loyalty-building corporate holiday cards, corporate social 
media accounts are as likely to offer a “happy holidays” message 
or a heartwarming story about an employee as they are to offer 
a discount on Christmas decorations.51 
For celebrities, social media creates opportunities for both 
formal and informal advertisements. Formal advertisements in-
volve a celebrity who is paid directly for her advertisement: for 
example, Kim Kardashian was paid $10,000 for making a Twitter 
post about retailer ShoeDazzle.com.52 In fact, an entire company, 
Ad.ly, has sprung up to pay celebrities for giving advertisement 
writers access to their Twitter accounts, typically earning celebri-
ties between $2,500 and $8,000 per post.53 In some cases, the lev-
els can reach even higher. Actor Charlie Sheen was paid “about 
$50,000 per tweet” for one Ad.ly campaign for Internships.com, 
which ultimately generated 82,148 internship applications and 
1,000,000 visits to the website.54 Informal advertising may be 
unintentional and take the form of using or posting about a 
product. For example, a dress worn by Lindsay Lohan sold out 
internationally within days after photos of her wearing it ap-
peared on social media.55 
Despite the prevalence of formal and informal advertising, so-
cial media advertising is not highly regulated. At least one author 
has called for more regulation of celebrity social media advertising 
 
 48 Duane Reade (Twitter, Mar 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5WFP-CUGU. 
 49 See Michel Laroche, Mohammad Reza Habibi, and Marie-Odile Richard, To Be or 
Not to Be in Social Media: How Brand Loyalty Is Affected by Social Media?, 33 Intl J Info 
Mgmt 76, 81 (2013) (“To the extent that a brand community based on social media acts 
to provide benefits . . . it cements the customers’ relationships with the brand, the prod-
uct, the company and other customers. These enhanced relationships result in enhanced 
brand loyalty.”). 
 50 Brand Loyalty (Collins English Dictionary), archived at http://perma.cc/YK6K-LJYT. 
 51 See Aleksandra Sagan, Tips for a Successful Social Media Holiday Campaign 
(Hootsuite), archived at http://perma.cc/T9F3-U3HE. 
 52 Piazza, How Much Can a Celebrity Make for Tweeting? (cited in note 47). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Liz Kelly, Lindsay Lohan’s White Dress Sells Out Online (Wash Post, Feb 11, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/D3SY-XGLK. 
  
2016] #Liability 465 
 
to prevent customers from being confused by informal advertis-
ing.56 Leah Feinman explains that disclosures are not currently re-
quired “when a reasonable consumer would presume that the [ce-
lebrity] was being compensated” for her endorsement.57 Feinman 
advocates for disclosures accompanying each sponsored mes-
sage.58 In addition to a lack of disclosures in messages that ce-
lebrities are paid to produce, celebrities are often not forthcom-
ing about whether they have a relationship with a brand or 
whether a given tweet was a part of that relationship. For ex-
ample, Ortiz acknowledged that he was a “social media insider” 
for Samsung, but he insisted that the selfie he took with Presi-
dent Obama was genuinely personal, even though it was later 
used in Samsung’s advertising.59 These ambiguous relationships 
between celebrities and companies may cause legal problems if 
the person in the photo is later surprised to find herself at the 
center of an advertising campaign that she did not approve.60 
B. Differences between Social Media and Conventional Media 
Before addressing the structural features of social media 
that will impact the viability of Lanham Act and right of publici-
ty claims, it should be made clear that social media represents a 
new phenomenon in several ways. Social media has more users, 
is more interactive, and costs less than conventional media. 
These attributes are discussed more below, as they demonstrate 
why companies should make an effort to use social media de-
spite potential liability. 
The first difference between social media and conventional 
media is the sheer size of the platform: at the end of 2013, 
Facebook had 1.23 billion active monthly users.61 By comparison, 
the largest American consumer magazine in the second half of 
2013 was AARP The Magazine with roughly 22.3 million 
 
 56 See Leah W. Feinman, Note, Celebrity Endorsements in Non-traditional Adver-
tising: How the FTC Regulations Fail to Keep Up with the Kardashians, 22 Fordham In-
tel Prop Media & Enter L J 97, 140–41, 143 (2011). 
 57 Id at 124. 
 58 Id at 138. 
 59 See Jim Baumbach, White House Not Sold on David Ortiz’s Selfie with Obama 
(Newsday, Apr 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7ZM2-NEZT (discussing the White 
House’s reaction to Ortiz’s relationship with Samsung and noting that Ortiz “insist[s] the 
presidential selfie wasn’t a planned stunt”). 
 60 Consider, for example, the White House’s poor reaction to Ortiz’s selfie. Id. 
 61 Ami Sedghi, Facebook: 10 Years of Social Networking, in Numbers (The Guardian, 
Feb 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/MK2M-4H5P. 
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subscribers, and the largest American nonpaid magazine had 
only 12.4 million recipients.62 Thus, advertising on Facebook 
targets an audience almost one hundred times larger than ad-
vertising in the most popular magazines. Even an advertisement 
aired on every public nightly news channel (ABC, CBS, and 
NBC) during the evening news broadcast would reach an aver-
age of only 22.1 million viewers.63 By contrast, two of the leading 
brands on Facebook (Coca-Cola and YouTube) had over eighty-
one million followers each in October 2015, allowing these 
brands to reach millions of people without spending a penny on 
distribution.64 Because the audience for every post is significant-
ly larger than for a print or television advertisement, companies 
are rightfully excited about the potential of social media. 
Furthermore, unlike conventional media, social media is in-
teractive and responsive. This interactivity allows fans to ex-
pand the audience of a company’s post and create a deeper rela-
tionship with the company. Fans can and do respond directly to 
celebrities and companies. Celebrities and companies can re-
spond back, creating a dialogue. Taylor Swift and Ariana 
Grande are known for endearing themselves to fans by respond-
ing to individual fan messages on social media from time to 
time, while Lady Gaga has attributed her success to her social 
media fans.65 Companies have also directly engaged with their 
consumers through social media. In 2015, Spotify won a Webby 
Award (used to reward the best websites and use of Internet 
technology) for its SpotifyCares Twitter account, which handles 
customer-service issues over social media.66 A customer having 
an issue with Spotify’s service can send a tweet to @SpotifyCares 
and receive technical support in real time. 
 
 62 Neal Lulofs, Top 25 U.S. Consumer Magazines for December 2013 (Alliance for 
Audited Media, Feb 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TJS9-JA3M.  
 63 Emily Guskin, Mark Jurkowitz, and Amy Mitchell, Network: By the Numbers 
(Pew Research Center, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/DZ6L-QXGX (discussing the 
viewership statistics for the year 2012). 
 64 Product Brands with the Most Facebook Fans as of October 2014 (in Millions) 
(Statista), archived at http://perma.cc/X3PY-38GR. 
 65 See Alexis Rhiannon, 9 Celebrities Who Might Just Interact with You on Social 
Media, Even Though You’re a Normal (Bustle, May 25, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L3UL-78GX; Lucy Bennett, Fan/Celebrity Interactions and Social Me-
dia: Connectivity and Engagement in Lady Gaga Fandom, in Linda Duits, Koos Zwaan, 
and Stijn Reijnders, eds, The Ashgate Research Companion to Fan Cultures 109, 111 
(Ashgate 2014). 
 66 See Spotify Social Media Customer Support (The Webby Awards, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/Y9FC-37MD. 
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Fans can also increase the reach of corporate speech by 
sharing a company’s post. In an earlier era, a fan might show 
her friend a magazine advertisement or talk about a television 
advertisement. Today, in a few keystrokes, a fan can send the 
advertisement to hundreds of her friends, who may well watch it 
and distribute it to their friends, and so on. Paranormal Activity, 
a 2009 horror film, became one of the most profitable films of all 
time after the $15,000 budget film distributed a trailer online 
that was widely shared on social media.67 The film generated 
over $100 million in revenue.68 
A final difference is that companies can enter the social me-
dia space for free. While companies may pay for posts to be pro-
moted to other users or spend money on creating graphics and 
videos,69 the account itself and the act of posting are both free.70 
The costs of creating a single social media post—in terms of staff 
time, production costs, and distribution—are dramatically lower 
than the costs of developing a print or television advertisement, 
allowing a company to substantially increase its advertising activ-
ity to a level that would be impossible in conventional media.71 
This reduced cost, combined with quick release time, may be 
why social media gaffes are a regular feature of daily news. In 
fact, ill-advised social media posts are so common that profes-
sional organizations now offer advice on how to properly apolo-
gize for them.72 
The size, interactivity, and low cost of social media are com-
pelling reasons for companies to become involved with these 
platforms. However, if companies use certain features of social 
media, they may find themselves on the wrong side of costly 
 
 67 Craig Carter, 15 Viral Marketing Examples over the Past 5 Years (Ignite Social 
Media, Sept 18, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9GEQ-2MCX. See also Amy Raphael, 
How Paranormal Activity Became a Frightening Success (The Guardian, Nov 20, 2009), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7C6M-SWUX. 
 68 Marisa Porter, Paranormal Activity: Viral Marketing Used to Generate 100 Million 
Dollars (Sentient Decision Science, Jan 14, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/6D2S-8CKK. 
 69 See text accompanying notes 33–35. 
 70 Most social media websites generate the bulk of their revenue through paid ad-
vertising. Data licensing (that is, selling information about users and public posts) is an-
other revenue source. See Pia Gadkari, How Does Twitter Make Money? (BBC, Nov 7, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GXA7-6QDG. 
 71 See Shea Bennett, Marketing 101 – Social Media vs Traditional Media 
[INFOGRAPHIC] (Social Times, July 13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/FP5Y-R4GC. 
 72 See, for example, Chris Syme, How to Nail the Social Media Apology (CASE, Aug 
22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/SX79-H3LX. 
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lawsuits filed by celebrities rather than simply enjoying the 
great value and large audience that social media can provide. 
C. Significance of Celebrity Lawsuits 
When social media and celebrities combine, it can be a potent 
combination for companies, drastically increasing sales and brand 
loyalty. However, legal uncertainty may have a chilling effect, 
causing companies to not take full advantage of these opportuni-
ties.73 This Comment counteracts the chilling effect that suits like 
Heigl’s have had on companies’ use of social media by providing 
guidance on how to stay within the boundaries of the law. 
As discussed above, seeing a product used by a celebrity on 
social media can massively increase the product’s sales. When 
fashion retailer Lord & Taylor paid fifty fashion bloggers to post 
photos of themselves wearing a specific dress on Instagram (a 
photo-sharing social media site), the dress sold out within days.74 
The effect with celebrities is even stronger. British Duchess of 
Cambridge Kate Middleton’s fashion choices have such a strong 
impact on clothing sales that the British media refers to it as the 
“Kate effect.”75 
Despite the clear benefits of highlighting celebrities, compa-
nies generally do not fill their social media accounts with images 
of stars using their products. Although a few brands have made 
a point to showcase celebrities’ use of their products,76 most do 
not. Even when a fashion blog like Tom + Lorenzo points out a 
celebrity wearing a brand’s clothes, most companies do not share 
this with their fans.77 
It was not always like this. For example, many restaurants 
have long posted photographs of celebrities on their walls proudly 
 
 73 Consider Brian Heidelberger, Can Brands Use Celebrities in Social Media with-
out Permission? (Advertising Age, Jan 30, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/N3MU 
-BWEX (discussing the various risk levels associated with companies’ use of celebrities 
on social media). 
 74 See Lauren Tuck, 50 Bloggers Wear the Same Dress, Sells Out within Days (Ya-
hoo Style, Apr 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/789G-98GU. 
 75 Lauren Milligan, The Kate Effect (Vogue, July 22, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NHA8-8NTM. 
 76 One example is designer Louis Vuitton’s August 20, 2015, Facebook post featur-
ing a picture of actress Lupita Nyong’o. Louis Vuitton, Lupita Nyong’o Wearing Louis 
Vuitton (Facebook), archived at http://perma.cc/8M5U-E5P8. 
 77 For example, when actress Reese Witherspoon was spotted wearing a J. Crew 
skirt, J. Crew said nothing, missing out on a great opportunity to connect with fans. See 
Reese Witherspoon in Draper James and J. Crew in Santa Monica (Tom + Lorenzo, Aug 
19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KN8N-G2EL. 
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proclaiming that celebrities like Arnold Palmer and James 
Brown ate there.78 Newspapers and Internet sites still report the 
restaurants at which celebrities dine,79 but it is rare to see a pic-
ture of a celebrity dining on a restaurant’s social media page. 
One of the reasons why companies are not taking advantage 
of these opportunities to build their brands is likely that they 
fear celebrity suits.80 None of these suits has gone to trial, which 
creates legal uncertainty as to whether posting photographs is 
in fact tortious. Without a clear framework with which to deter-
mine whether they will be held liable, it makes sense for risk-
averse (and cost-averse) companies to avoid litigation costs by 
settling their individual cases and avoiding similar behavior in 
the future. 
The continued lack of case law has likely caused companies 
to shy away from lawful social media activity. Scholars have 
long recognized that legal uncertainty causes “overcomplying,” 
in which defendants err on the side of caution more than is so-
cially optimal.81 Both companies and social media users benefit 
when companies post celebrity photos on social media—the com-
panies’ sales increase and social media users are better able to 
emulate their celebrity idols. 
This Comment reduces this uncertainty, and therefore reduc-
es overcompliance, by providing a guide to the legal framework 
and specific behaviors that companies can use to reduce their risk 
of liability. As both uncertainty and risk of liability decrease, 
companies should increase their social media activity to a more 
socially optimal level. Once the legal lines are clear, companies 
will be able to share valuable information with consumers. 
 
 78 See, for example, Meg Mirshak, Restaurants Line Walls with Celebrity Photos 
(The Augusta Chronicle, July 16, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/X9CR-W7XA. 
 79 See, for example, Lesley Abravanel, Celebrities Spotted around Town at Hot 
Spots (Miami Herald, Feb 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/R3GM-59FB. 
 80 See Melissa Maleske, 6 IP Dilemmas That Can Trip Up GCs (Law360, June 22, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D6BG-4P3J (discussing litigation problems and risks 
from an intellectual property standpoint, including the risk of companies’ social media 
posts referencing celebrities or other brands). 
 81 John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 Va L Rev 965, 966 (1984). See also Bruce Chapman, Corporate 
Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S Cal L Rev 1679, 1683 (1996) 
(“[O]vercompliance occurs when the defendant takes more than the socially cost-justified 
level of precautions.”). 
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D. An Example: The Heigl Complaint 
Parts III and IV use the facts of an actual complaint, filed 
by Heigl against drugstore Duane Reade, to illustrate the key 
legal differences between social media and conventional media. 
The facts are as follows: Heigl is an actress and celebrity who 
has granted permission for selected uses of her name and pic-
ture to a foundation that she created.82 She maintains an official 
Twitter account (“@KatieHeigl”), which had over 754,000 follow-
ers as of the date she filed her complaint.83 In March 2014, drug-
store Duane Reade posted a photograph of Heigl leaving a 
Duane Reade store on Twitter with the caption “Love a quick 
#DuaneReade run? Even @KatieHeigl can’t resist shopping 
#NYC’s favorite drugstore.”84 The photograph was also posted on 
Duane Reade’s Facebook page with a revised caption: “Don’t you 
just love a quick #DuaneReade run? Even Katherine Heigl can’t 
resist shopping at #NYC’s most convenient drugstore!”85 Heigl al-
legedly did not consent to the use of her image, which was origi-
nally taken by a paparazzi photographer and posted on the celeb-
rity news site Just Jared in a story about Heigl changing talent 
agencies.86 It does not appear from the complaint that Duane 
Reade purchased the rights to the image from the photographer.87 
At the time, Duane Reade had over 2,000,000 followers on 
Twitter88 (as of August 2015, its official Facebook page had just 
over 100,000 followers).89 Duane Reade stated that its online so-
cial media campaign was meant to “drive awareness, engage-
ment, and increase sales at all retail stores using digital market-
ing strategies.”90 Heigl alleged that the company’s social media 
posts “predominantly promote commercial advertisements for a 
wide range of its products and services,”91 although a quick glance 
at the company’s current usage suggests a balance of feel-good 
 
 82 Heigl Complaint at *3–4 (cited in note 1). 
 83 Id at *4. 
 84 Id at *7 (emphasis omitted). 
 85 Id (emphasis omitted). It is not clear whether Heigl’s official Facebook account 
was tagged in the Facebook post, and the post has since been removed.  
 86 Heigl Complaint at *7–8 (cited in note 1). 
 87 Id at *8. 
 88 Id at *5. 
 89 Duane Reade (Facebook), archived at http://perma.cc/3A6E-RM8B. 
 90 Heigl Complaint at *5–6 (cited in note 1). 
 91 Id at *6. 
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posts with no mention of specific goods or services92 and posts 
that clearly encourage the buying of goods or services.93 
Heigl’s case is interesting for several reasons. In addition to 
being one of the first test cases for Lanham Act and right of pub-
licity claims on social media, Duane Reade tagged Heigl by her 
Twitter username rather than using her real name. Further-
more, Duane Reade used content created by a paparazzi photog-
rapher rather than content generated in-house. As discussed be-
low, these features (the username, the act of tagging, and the 
sharing of someone else’s content) may also influence the legal 
analysis in novel ways. Part IV elaborates on these devices. But 
first, Part II provides background on the Lanham Act and the 
right of publicity (both of which were used in the Heigl com-
plaint) as well as the possible First Amendment defense that 
Duane Reade could have raised. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE LANHAM ACT, THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
This Comment covers two distinct causes of action that may 
be brought against companies that post unauthorized pictures of 
celebrities on social media—the Lanham Act and the right of 
publicity. These claims are commonly alleged together94 and 
courts often treat the claims as closely related.95 Generally 
speaking, Lanham Act claims cover consumer confusion over 
whether an individual has endorsed a product, while right of 
publicity claims cover the economic loss associated with lost op-
portunities or goodwill. Since a false endorsement could lead to a 
celebrity losing sponsorship opportunities or the goodwill of her 
fans, it makes sense that these claims are often brought togeth-
er. Part II.A describes § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which covers 
 
 92 For example, a September 28, 2015, Facebook post from Duane Reade read 
“Happy National Good Neighbor Day! Tell those people who pop on your list of wifi net-
works how much they mean to you.” Duane Reade, Happy National Good Neighbor Day! 
(Facebook, Sept 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BR9S-EKPG. 
 93 For example, a January 17, 2016, Facebook post read: “Still finding your 2016 
organizational groove? Take 25% off a custom photo calendar.” Duane Reade, Still Find-
ing Your 2016 Organizational Groove? (Facebook, Jan 17, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YUD3-3ESD. 
 94 See, for example, Heigl Complaint at *2 (cited in note 1). See also Rogers v Gri-
maldi, 875 F2d 994, 996 (2d Cir 1989). 
 95 See, for example, ETW Corp v Jireh Publishing, Inc, 332 F3d 915, 924 (6th Cir 
2003), citing Bruce P. Keller, The Right of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 1207 PLI 
Corp L & Prac Handbook, 159, 170 (Oct 2000) (“In fact, one legal scholar has said that a 
Lanham Act false endorsement claim is the federal equivalent of the right of publicity.”). 
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false endorsement claims based on the use of “marks” (such as a 
celebrity’s name) that create consumer confusion. Part II.B gives 
an overview of the right of publicity, including its focus on the 
use of a person’s name or photograph in an advertisement. Part 
II.C explains the First Amendment public-interest (or “newswor-
thiness”) defense, which can be used to defeat Lanham Act and 
right of publicity liability if the post provides information to the 
public on a matter of public interest. 
A. The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act covers uses of marks, such as a person’s 
name, that could lead consumers to make a false association be-
tween a product and a person without her consent. Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act provides: 
Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . 
which[ ] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, spon-
sorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable.96 
Unlike right of publicity claims, Lanham Act claims cannot 
be made on the basis of a picture alone since photographs are 
not included in the statute’s list (“word, term, name, symbol, or 
device”).97 The infringer must identify the person by name or 
mark; a nickname or other name that identifies only the celebri-
ty may be sufficient.98 
Each circuit has developed its own test for determining 
whether the Lanham Act has been violated by a given act. The 
Ninth Circuit’s test is typical.99 It considers: 
 
 96 15 USC § 1125(a)(1). 
 97 See ETW Corp, 332 F3d at 922 (holding that the likeness of Tiger Woods is not a 
trademark that is protected by the Lanham Act); Pirone v MacMillan, Inc, 894 F2d 579, 
583 (2d Cir 1990) (finding that there is no trademark over photographs of Babe Ruth). 
 98 For example, in a right of publicity claim, Muhammad Ali was able to claim that 
a cartoon labeled “The Greatest” clearly identified him. Ali v Playgirl, Inc, 447 F Supp 
723, 727 (SDNY 1978). 
 99 The Sixth Circuit has adopted a test that is almost identical to the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc v American Eagle Outfitters, Inc, 280 F3d 
619, 646 (6th Cir 2002). Although the Seventh and Third Circuits use largely similar 
tests, the Seventh Circuit omits the likely expansion of product lines and the degree of 
care that is likely to be exercised by the purchaser. See Henri’s Food Products Co v Kraft, 
Inc, 717 F2d 352, 354 (7th Cir 1983). In contrast, the Third Circuit adds “the extent to 
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1. strength of the mark;  
2. proximity of the goods;  
3. similarity of the marks;  
4. evidence of actual confusion;  
5. marketing channels used;  
6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised 
by the purchaser;  
7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and  
8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.100 
The “mark” in the celebrity context typically refers to the ce-
lebrity’s identity or persona, and the “strength” refers to the ce-
lebrity’s fame, especially among consumers of that specific prod-
uct.101 New modes of advertising may impact the “marketing 
channels used” factor. 
By the language of the Lanham Act itself, causing “confu-
sion” about a person’s “sponsorship or approval” of a product is a 
violation of the Act.102 For cases of sponsorship or endorsement 
confusion (as opposed to confusion about the identity or origin of 
a product), the courts of appeals consider context-specific factors 
(such as the strength of the mark and evidence of actual confu-
sion) to determine the likelihood of confusion. The goods-focused 
factors (such as proximity and similarity) may not play a role in 
the celebrity-image cases, because the plaintiff alleges confusion 
about the endorsement rather than a deception of fact about the 
good.103 
Courts have already begun customizing these factors to the 
specifics of social media. For example, tweets have been used in 
at least one case as evidence of actual confusion between two so-
cial media tools with similar names, suggesting that the confu-
sion of social media fans is a valid form of consumer confusion.104 
This use of Twitter posts is important because it highlights that 
 
which the targets of the parties’ sales efforts are the same.” A&H Sportswear, Inc v Vic-
toria’s Secret Stores, Inc, 237 F3d 198, 211 (3d Cir 2000). 
 100 AMF Inc v Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir 1979).  
 101 See Naeha Prakash, Stars in Their Eyes: The Dominance of the Celebrity Brand 
and Intellectual Property Norms Protection through Fan Goodwill, 35 Hastings Commun 
& Enter L J 247, 259–60 (2013).  
 102 15 USC § 1125(a). 
 103 See, for example, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v Church, 411 F2d 350, 
350–52 (9th Cir 1969) (upholding the district court’s determination that there was not 
sufficient confusion to constitute a violation of the Lanham Act when “Volkswagen” was 
paired with the word “independent” in an advertisement). 
 104 See Boathouse Group, Inc v TigerLogic Corp, 777 F Supp 2d 243, 253 (D Mass 2011). 
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the definition of “consumer” will be read broadly to include fans 
on social media as well as people who actually purchase the 
wrong product. As courts continue to encounter Lanham Act 
claims involving social media, they will have to reconsider the 
applicability of prior decisions and other legal constructions. 
This opens up new legal frontiers, but it also increases short-
term uncertainty while courts settle on how to address social 
media. When misleading fans online (even if they do not pur-
chase anything) is a Lanham Act risk, companies must be even 
more careful to comply with the Act. 
B. The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is the right of a person “to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity.”105 It is a state law claim 
that is recognized by common law or statute in thirty-one states, 
and only two states have held that no such right exists under the 
common law.106 The right of publicity claim is a tool that “provides 
an economic incentive for [an individual] to make the investment 
required to produce a performance of interest”107 and “prevent[s] 
unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.”108 The right is in-
tended to remedy economic harms that are associated with the 
loss of sponsorship opportunities or the loss of goodwill, both of 
which reduce the “business value” of the celebrity’s identity.109 
Because the right of publicity is a state law claim, states have 
developed separate statutes and jurisprudence with different le-
gal elements. California’s language is typical: “Any person who 
knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, 
or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, 
products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person’s 
prior consent” commits the tort.110 For example, in one textbook 
 
 105 J. Thomas McCarthy, 5 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 28:1 
at 28-3 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed 2014). 
 106 Id at 28-47. 
 107 Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, 433 US 562, 576 (1977). 
 108 Id. 
 109 McCarthy, 5 McCarthy on Trademarks at 28-8 to -9 (cited in note 105) (explain-
ing that the right to publicity “is a commercial and business right”). 
 110 Cal Civ Code § 3344(a). This Comment emphasizes the statute and the court cases 
coming from California because a large share of right of publicity jurisprudence emerges 
from that state. As of January 2016, a Westlaw search for “right of publicity” found that 
of the 246 state-level cases mentioning the right of publicity, 92 came from California. 
The next highest was New York with 46 cases. At the federal level, of the 961 cases that 
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right of publicity case, a model had agreed to have his photo 
used on the front of bricks of coffee sold in Canada, only to dis-
cover that the image had been used on instant-coffee packaging 
all around the world.111 Because the company had used his pho-
tograph without his consent, the model was awarded actual 
damages and a portion of the profits from the instant-coffee 
sales,112 subject to a determination of whether the statute of lim-
itations had run. 
The statutory emphasis on inclusion in an advertisement 
(or another communication that has the “purpose[ ] of advertis-
ing or selling, or soliciting purchases”113) has led to a fragment-
ed jurisprudence when new forms of advertising are intro-
duced. How to define an “advertisement” that can deprive a 
celebrity of value continues to be debated in right of publicity 
cases. This inquiry is sometimes confused with whether the 
supposed “advertisement” is commercial or noncommercial 
speech,114 because both the definition of an “advertisement” and 
the commercial/noncommercial speech distinction originally 
centered on whether the speech did no more than propose a 
transaction.115 For example, a message simply proposing a 
 
mention the right of publicity, 331 came from within the Ninth Circuit while courts with-
in the Second Circuit (the next highest) had referred to the right in 141 cases.  
 111 See Christoff v Nestlé USA, Inc, 213 P3d 132, 134–35 (Cal 2009). 
 112 See id at 136. One reason that celebrities are typically the plaintiffs in right of 
publicity cases is that they can prove damages (lost business value) more easily than 
noncelebrity plaintiffs, although statutory damages are sometimes available to encour-
age noncelebrity plaintiffs to bring lawsuits. See Brian D. Wassom, Uncertainty Squared: 
The Right of Publicity and Social Media, 63 Syracuse L Rev 227, 242–44 (2013) (provid-
ing an overview of states that use statutory damages as an alternative to actual damag-
es). For an example of a noncelebrity right of publicity case, see Third Amended Class 
Action Complaint, Perkins v LinkedIn Corp, Civil Action No 13-04303, *60–62 (ND Cal 
filed Dec 15, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 7691849). 
 113 Cal Civ Code § 3344(a). 
 114 An advertisement can be commercial or noncommercial speech, and commercial 
speech need not be a conventional advertisement. See Bolger v Youngs Drug Products 
Corp, 463 US 60, 66 (1983) (“The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be ad-
vertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech.”). 
Furthermore, in Bolger, one of the pamphlets was strictly health information without 
any discussion of Youngs’s products, but it was still found to be commercial speech. Id at 
62 n 4, 67–68. The Court considered it important that the pamphlets were conceded to be 
advertisements, referenced specific products (in some mailings), and had a commercial 
motivation for the mailings. Id at 66–67. See also Kasky v Nike, Inc, 45 P3d 243, 248, 
254, 259 (Cal 2002) (applying Bolger’s three-factor test—concerning “advertising format, 
product references, and commercial motivation”—and finding that press releases and 
letters released by Nike regarding how well it paid its workers constituted commercial 
speech even though such statements were not standard “advertisements”). 
 115 See Bolger, 463 US at 66. 
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transaction might read “Come buy the new edition of The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review, only $75 at the bookstore!” How-
ever, a message that simply reads “Congratulations to The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review on a great year!” does not propose 
a transaction and does not fall within the traditional definition 
of “advertising” or “commercial speech.” As companies have be-
come more creative and stopped simply proposing transactions, 
courts have struggled to determine what constitutes an “adver-
tisement” within the meaning of the right of publicity. 
Courts have begun adapting legal tests to the variety of 
ways that companies advertise. The Seventh Circuit has found 
that a “congratulatory message” to Michael Jordan featuring a 
retailer’s name and slogan was an advertisement, even though it 
promoted “brand awareness or loyalty” rather than urging fans 
to buy a specific product.116 Similarly, the Third Circuit has 
found that a half-hour-long film about a video game was an ad-
vertisement, even though a documentary film is an uncommon 
form for an advertisement.117 When the National Football 
League created promotional videos, a district court found the 
videos could qualify as advertisements and allowed former play-
ers to sue under the right of publicity.118 
These cases demonstrate that courts are already beginning 
to think flexibly about the definition of “advertisement,” pushing 
beyond its conventional definition. As this expansion continues, 
companies must increase their awareness of right of publicity 
law, since previously legal conduct may now cause liability. For 
 
 116 Jordan v Jewel Food Stores, Inc, 743 F3d 509, 518 (7th Cir 2014). 
 117 Facenda v N.F.L. Films, Inc, 542 F3d 1007, 1017 (3d Cir 2008). 
 118 Dryer v National Football League, 689 F Supp 2d 1113, 1120 (D Minn 2010). 
When athletes can bring right of publicity claims (for instance, for the use of their names, 
faces, or statistics in video games) is a fast-moving area of litigation that is outside the 
scope of this Comment. See generally, for example, Kendall K. Johnson, Enforceable Fair 
and Square: The Right of Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Con-
tracts, 19 Sports L J 1 (2012) (concluding that the use of a college athlete’s likeness with-
out compensation is not unconscionable, such that his right of publicity suit should fail); 
Mary Catherine Moore, Note, There Is No “I” in NCAA: Why College Sports Video Games 
Do Not Violate College Athletes’ Right of Publicity Such to Entitle Them to Compensation 
for Use of Their Likenesses, 18 J Intel Prop L 269 (2010) (arguing that college athletes 
need not be compensated for the use of their likenesses because of free speech protec-
tions). But see generally, for example, Jennifer Hinds, Comment, The One-Sided Games of 
the NCAA: How In Re NCAA Student-Athlete Levels the Playing Field, 35 Loyola LA 
Enter L Rev 95 (2014) (insisting that NCAA contracts waiving student athletes’ rights to 
compensation are procedurally unconscionable); Pamela Edwards, What’s the Score?: Does 
the Right of Publicity Protect Professional Sports Leagues?, 62 Albany L Rev 579 (1998) (ar-
guing that sports leagues have a protectable identity under the right to publicity). 
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celebrities whose images are posted on social media, these new 
definitions may allow them to create right of publicity claims 
that would not have existed even ten years ago. 
C. First Amendment Defense 
Both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims can be de-
feated if the defendant can show that its usage was protected by 
the First Amendment. While courts tend to begin the First 
Amendment inquiry by asking whether the speech is commercial 
or noncommercial,119 First Amendment protection can turn not 
only on this distinction but also on whether the speech is found 
to be in the public interest.120 Some courts protect public-interest 
speech by effectively removing it from the category of commer-
cial speech (even if it otherwise meets the definition),121 while 
others acknowledge the action as commercial speech and then 
proceed with the public-interest inquiry.122 Regardless of how the 
court doctrinally places the analysis of the public-interest de-
fense, the effect is the same: if speech is found to be in the public 
interest, it is protected by the First Amendment. 
The public-interest defense is essentially a right to inform 
the public, although what information and distribution methods 
are included is sometimes disputed. The public-interest defense 
is based on the premise that “no cause of action will lie for the 
publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the 
right of the public to know and the freedom of the press to tell 
it.”123 Although some courts adhere to a firm distinction between 
 
 119 See, for example, Bolger, 463 US at 65–66 (noting that the court “must first de-
termine the proper classification of the [expression]” because the scope of First Amend-
ment protections “depends on whether the activity . . . constitutes commercial or non-
commercial speech”). 
 120 For example, in a suit involving allegations of unfair competition and false ad-
vertising under state law, the California Supreme Court noted that courts applying the 
modern commercial speech doctrine can find that “truthful and nonmisleading speech 
about commercial matters of public importance is entitled to constitutional protection.” 
Kasky, 45 P3d at 260.  
 121 See, for example, Rogers, 695 F Supp at 121 (noting that the state law right of 
publicity did not apply to matters of public interest, even though the conduct was “car-
ried on for a profit”). 
 122 See, for example, Yeager v Cingular Wireless LLC, 673 F Supp 2d 1089, 1097–98 
(ED Cal 2009) (concluding that “the Publication [was] properly categorized as commer-
cial speech” before continuing on to its public-interest analysis). 
 123 Hilton v Cards, 599 F3d 894, 912 (9th Cir 2010), citing Montana v San Jose Mer-
cury News, Inc, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 639, 640 (Cal App 1995). See also Smith v NBC Univer-
sal, 524 F Supp 2d 315, 325 (SDNY 2007) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the publica-
tion of facts that are both truthful and newsworthy.”).  
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advertising and “legitimate news item[s]” printed in newspa-
pers,124 other courts are more flexible and have found that 
newsworthy information is not “automatically privileged” and 
that factors such as the form of transmission (for example, a 
newspaper, television show, or documentary) can be taken into 
account.125 
In cases involving both print and video depictions of celebri-
ties, courts have also considered the subject of the speech. Fa-
mous people are sometimes seen as more likely to generate 
newsworthy information because “[p]ublic interest attaches to 
people who by their accomplishments or mode of living create a 
bona fide attention to their activities.”126 However, these same 
courts refuse to allow the use of a celebrity to qualify for a public-
interest defense if the use is “tenuous” and the celebrity’s inclu-
sion is a mere “illustrative use” that “does not contribute signifi-
cantly to a matter of the public interest.”127 To avoid the potential 
tautology of allowing the use of a celebrity to be considered in the 
public interest when the “public interest” is the celebrity’s life, 
courts have been disinclined to consider “promot[ing] an unrelat-
ed product” to constitute a “matter of public interest.”128 Similarly, 
courts typically distinguish between public-interest matters and 
those that are “advertisement[s] in disguise” or those in which the 
celebrity “has no real relationship to the article.”129 
For example, the Eleventh Circuit recently engaged in “fact-
sensitive balancing” to figure out whether publishing a profes-
sional wrestler’s nude photos after her murder fell within the 
public-interest exception to the right of publicity.130 The court 
used “the relationship between the published photographs and 
 
 124 Nichols v Moore, 334 F Supp 2d 944, 955 (ED Mich 2004).  
 125 Abdul-Jabbar v General Motors Corp, 85 F3d 407, 416 (9th Cir 1996). The California 
Supreme Court has proposed nonexclusive “guidelines” for whether a report is newswor-
thy, which include “the depth of the intrusion into the plaintiff ’s private affairs, the ex-
tent to which the plaintiff voluntarily pushed himself into a position of public notoriety, 
the exact nature of the state’s interest in preventing the disclosure, and whether the in-
formation is a matter of public record,” as well as “any continued public interest in the 
event” and “the circumstances prevailing at the time of publication.” Forsher v Bugliosi, 
608 P2d 716, 727 (Cal 1980). 
 126 Hilton, 599 F3d at 912, citing Dora v Frontline Video, Inc, 18 Cal Rptr 2d 790, 
792 (Cal App 1993). 
 127 Downing v Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir 2001). 
 128 Yeager, 673 F Supp 2d at 1099. 
 129 Creel v Crown Publishers, Inc, 496 NYS2d 219, 220 (NY App 1985), citing 
Dallesandro v Henry Holt and Co, 166 NYS2d 805, 806 (NY App 1957). 
 130 Toffoloni v LFP Publishing Group, LLC, 572 F3d 1201, 1204, 1208 (11th Cir 2009). 
Because the wrestler was deceased, the right of publicity was exercised by her estate. 
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the corresponding article, as well as the relationship between the 
published photographs and the incident of public concern—[the] 
murder”—to determine whether the photographs were in the pub-
lic interest.131 The court found that the images did not provide in-
formation to the public and were not sufficiently related to the ar-
ticle or to the woman’s death, and therefore that the public-
interest defense did not apply.132 
In contrast, a California appellate court upheld a lower 
court’s dismissal based on the public-interest defense in Montana 
v San Jose Mercury News, Inc.133 In Montana, San Francisco 
49ers quarterback Joe Montana sued the San Jose Mercury 
News for printing posters that included a photograph of him 
playing in the Super Bowl, alleging a violation of his right of 
publicity because the newspaper did not compensate him for the 
use of the photograph.134 The court found that selling the post-
ers, replicas of the newspaper’s front pages when the 49ers won 
the Super Bowl, was protected by the public-interest defense be-
cause Montana was “a major player in contemporaneous news-
worthy sports events.”135 Even though the newspaper sold the 
posters for profit, it found that the newspaper “had a right to re-
publish its front page sports stories to show the quality of its 
work product.”136 This case demonstrates several of the factors 
that are commonly used in public-interest-defense cases. First, 
there was an actual newsworthy event of public interest: the 
Super Bowl. Second, there was a relationship between the words 
and the pictures used, because Montana was a large part of the 
Super Bowl win. Finally, the connection to the celebrity was not 
tenuous window dressing, because the high-quality reporting on 
the Super Bowl was not unrelated to the newspaper’s product.137 
The gist of the public-interest defense is that a publisher 
should be able to give the public the information it needs, as 
long as its need is not purely voyeuristic. Courts will not protect 
speech that serves no purpose “beyond the voyeuristic thrill of 
penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a stranger.”138 
However, the line between peeping and proper is complicated 
 
 131 Id at 1208–09. 
 132 Id at 1212. 
 133 40 Cal Rptr 2d 639, 640 (Cal App 1995).  
 134 Id. 
 135 Id at 641.  
 136 Id at 642.  
 137 Montana, 40 Cal Rptr 2d at 640–43. 
 138 Haynes v Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 8 F3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir 1993). 
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with celebrities. The public wants as much information about ce-
lebrities as it can get, and celebrities are arguably always 
newsworthy. On the other hand, courts do not want to “indirect-
ly expose everyone’s private life to public view” by finding a per-
son’s life to be an open book once she has done anything news-
worthy.139 To this end, courts apply special scrutiny to speech 
involving celebrities, testing the relationship between the celeb-
rity and the subject of the speech. Although the test is not iden-
tical in every court, it is often phrased in terms of whether there 
is a relationship and whether this relationship is “tenuous.”140 
However, it is not clear how courts will map these factors onto 
social media. For example, should a court analyze a company’s 
entire page or just one post? How can a court determine whether 
a post is about a newsworthy event, especially when posts are so 
short? How should courts think about newsworthiness itself in 
the age of selfies that are shared by thousands of people? These 
ambiguities leave companies able to vigorously assert their First 
Amendment rights under the public-interest defense if they are 
sued over a social media post, as is discussed below. 
III.  OLD LAW IS NEW AGAIN: NICKNAMES, ADVERTISING, AND 
PUBLIC CONTROVERSIES 
Social media’s features are fundamentally different in struc-
ture and scope than those of conventional media. These struc-
tural features will require plaintiffs and judges to stretch exist-
ing law in new ways, and businesses can exploit these structural 
differences to creatively promote themselves while staying with-
in the bounds of the law. This Part zeroes in on the specific fac-
ets of Lanham Act, right of publicity, and First Amendment law 
that affect companies who want to take advantage of these 
unique features of social media. Part III.A discusses the law of 
nicknames under the Lanham Act, which likely applies to 
usernames. Part III.B describes a new view of advertising that 
may change the calculus of right of publicity claims, especially 
with regard to linking. Finally, Part III.C explains the First 
Amendment public-interest defense as it relates to public con-
troversies and so-called window dressing, which is relevant to 
sharing content on social media. 
 
 139 Virgil v Time, Inc, 527 F2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir 1975). 
 140 See, for example, Downing, 265 F3d at 1002. 
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A. Nickname Protection under the Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act applies to all uses of a name or other 
mark, including on social media. Usernames present unique dif-
ficulties in applying the Lanham Act, which is built around con-
ventional media, to social media. The Lanham Act’s language 
confines the Act to the unlicensed use of names or words, which 
has sometimes been read to include nicknames. This Section ex-
plores the Lanham Act’s restrictions and the relationship be-
tween Lanham Act claims and nicknames. 
Companies who post celebrity photographs can breathe an in-
itial sigh of relief: the Lanham Act does not cover the use of pho-
tographs alone. The Act’s language limits itself to the use of “any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination there-
of,”141 and courts in several circuits have found that a person’s pic-
ture alone is not a sufficient “symbol.”142 For example, in ETW 
Corp v Jireh Publishing, Inc,143 Tiger Woods’s licensing agent 
sued an art publisher after the publisher printed a painting that 
contained three images of Woods.144 The court decided that to al-
low a Lanham Act claim for the use of Woods’s image without his 
name would “constitute Woods himself as a walking, talking 
trademark” and would fail to meet the goals of the Lanham Act 
because the paintings would not cause consumer confusion.145 
Because the painting did not contain Woods’s name or an affili-
ated slogan, Woods could not sue under the Lanham Act. How-
ever, stage names and nicknames have been protected, which 
raises questions as to whether social media usernames will qual-
ify for protection. 
Stage names have been protected by courts as if they were 
legal names. For example, in one case a magazine published a 
nude sketch of Muhammad Ali, which was labeled “The Greatest” 
rather than using Ali’s name.146 The court found that although 
Ali’s name was not used, he referred to himself as “The Greatest” 
and others referred to him by this stage name, so the moniker 
 
 141 15 USC § 1125(a)(1). 
 142 See, for example, ETW Corp v Jireh Publishing, Inc, 332 F3d 915, 922 (6th Cir 
2003) (holding that the likeness of Tiger Woods was not a trademark protected by Lanham 
Act); Pirone v MacMillan, Inc, 894 F2d 579, 583 (2d Cir 1990) (holding that the likeness 
of Babe Ruth was not protected). 
 143 332 F3d 915 (6th Cir 2003). 
 144 Id at 918. 
 145 Id at 922. 
 146 Ali v Playgirl, Inc, 447 F Supp 723, 725, 727 (SDNY 1978). 
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was a “name” that triggered the Lanham Act.147 In a similar state 
law claim of trade name infringement, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court found that the use of the nickname “Crazylegs” was suffi-
ciently identifying to interfere with a former star football play-
er’s ability to use his name.148 
Furthermore, even corporate or brand nicknames have been 
afforded trademark protection (including Lanham Act protec-
tion) through a process of public recognition, although it can 
take “years or even generations” before a nickname is legally 
recognized.149 For example, it took Coca-Cola twenty-six years of 
public use for the company to trademark the nickname “Coke” 
for its signature drink.150 These nicknames become protected 
through a theory known as the public-use doctrine. 
The public-use doctrine is traditionally applied to abbrevia-
tions coined by the public that have become so widespread that 
they identify a product as well as its trademarked name. In fact, 
the Federal Circuit has suggested that the public-use doctrine 
applies to “abbreviations and nicknames of trademarks or 
names used only by the public,” while nicknames generated by a 
company do not qualify for protection.151 A nickname adopted by 
a trademark holder as its own might not qualify for protection. 
Similarly, some courts take seriously the idea that only short-
ened nicknames can qualify. For example, the Fourth Circuit re-
jected a company’s effort to enforce trademark rights in the term 
“LEFT CENTER RIGHT” based on its previous use of the abbre-
viation “LCR,” reasoning that the doctrine was applicable only 
when the public chose to use a shortened version of a mark.152 
However, social media usernames do not fall cleanly into ei-
ther of these categories and it is not clear how courts will treat 
them. They are not stage names, used by celebrities as if they were 
their legal names. Nor are they publicly generated nicknames used 
 
 147 Id at 727–29. 
 148 Hirsch v S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc, 280 NW2d 129, 131 (Wis 1979). 
 149 Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Crowdsourcing a Trademark: What the Public Giveth, 
the Courts May Taketh Away, 35 Hastings Commun & Enter L J 35, 36–37 (2012). 
 150 Id. 
 151 National Cable Television Association, Inc v American Cinema Editors, Inc, 937 
F2d 1572, 1577 (Fed Cir 1991). See also George & Co v Imagination Entertainment Ltd, 
575 F3d 383, 403 (4th Cir 2009), quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trade-
marks and Unfair Competition § 7:18 (Thomson Reuters 1994) (“The Public Use doctrine 
was developed because ‘Americans are prone to abbreviate recognized trademarks and to 
use nicknames.’”). 
 152 George & Co, 575 F3d at 403–04 (“[T]he doctrine is applied when the public ab-
breviates or nicknames a term, not the other way around.”). 
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as shorthand by the public to identify a celebrity. Including a ce-
lebrity’s username with the photograph has many benefits for 
the company—it increases the prominence of the post in users’ 
feeds and it may add the picture to the celebrity’s page.153 More 
banally, it could help to identify the celebrity if the picture is 
blurry or the celebrity’s face is partially concealed. Whether a 
username is a sufficient hook to invoke the Lanham Act has 
never been addressed by courts, but, as discussed in Part IV.A, 
social media usernames will likely create Lanham Act claims. 
B. Right of Publicity: Advertising as Theft of Goodwill 
Social media introduces a potential wrinkle into a would-be 
plaintiff’s right of publicity suit as well: Is a Facebook or Twitter 
post an advertisement? Although posts may not appear to be ad-
vertisements under traditional tests, new views of advertising 
that emphasize the theft of goodwill may turn social media posts 
into close calls. Recall that for a right of publicity claim to suc-
ceed, the photograph must have been used as an advertise-
ment.154 The issue of what constitutes advertising rarely arises 
in right of publicity cases because most of the uses “[do] no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.”155 In such cases there is 
no question that “the defendant used an aspect of the celebrity’s 
identity entirely and directly for the purpose of selling a prod-
uct.”156 In this framework, a post like the Heigl tweet157 would 
not fall within the statute’s scope, because it is not “entirely and 
directly”158 for the purpose of selling a specific product; rather 
than explicitly asking the viewer to buy anything, it instead 
seeks to foster indirect loyalty and respect for Duane Reade’s 
brand. However, courts have begun to take a different view of 
advertising that could increase the reach of right of publicity 
statutes. This Section explains the new view of advertising, de-
fined as a publication that increases loyalty or goodwill rather 
than simply proposing a transaction. As explained in Part IV.B, 
 
 153 See Part I.B. 
 154 Cal Civ Code § 3344(a) (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s . . . photo-
graph . . . for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases . . . without such 
person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable.”). Other right of publicity statutes offer some-
what broader language, such as “for commercial purposes” or “for the purposes of trade” 
in Illinois and New York, respectively. 765 ILCS 1075/30; NY Civ Rts Law §§ 50–51. 
 155 Hoffman v Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 255 F3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir 2001). 
 156 Id (emphasis added). 
 157 See Duane Reade (cited in note 48). 
 158 Hoffman, 255 F3d at 1185. 
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this new view of advertising could render linking tools off-limits 
for companies who want to avoid liability for right of publicity 
violations. 
Courts have begun to move away from the traditional defi-
nition of advertising to a holistic one that focuses on the theft of 
goodwill. The most instructive case for the new view of advertis-
ing is Jordan v Jewel Food Stores, Inc.159 In Jordan, the Seventh 
Circuit found that a full-page picture of a pair of basketball 
shoes bearing Michael Jordan’s number with congratulatory 
text160 upon his induction into the Basketball Hall of Fame was 
an advertisement.161 The court found that “[m]odern commercial 
advertising is enormously varied in form and style” and “relies 
on subtle cues,” so a message can still be commercial advertising 
when “it promotes brand awareness or loyalty rather than ex-
plicitly proposing a transaction in a specific product or ser-
vice.”162 The court determined that the message was a loyalty-
generating advertisement because it was “plainly aimed at fos-
tering goodwill for the Jewel brand” based on the inclusion of 
Jewel’s brand name in the visual and the use of Jewel’s slogan 
“just around the corner.”163 
 
 159 743 F3d 509 (7th Cir 2014). 
 160 For the exact text of the advertisement, see id at 512:  
A Shoe In! After six NBA championships, scores of rewritten record books and 
numerous buzzer beaters, Michael Jordan’s elevation in the Basketball Hall of 
Fame was never in doubt! Jewel-Osco salutes #23 on his many accomplish-
ments as we honor a fellow Chicagoan who was “just around the corner” for so 
many years. 
 161 Id. Note that this case was decided in the context of whether the speech was pro-
tected under the First Amendment (the lower court had found that the advertisement 
was noncommercial speech and was therefore protected). Id at 513. This makes sense, 
given that the Illinois statute requires only “commercial purposes” for a right of publicity 
claim, while other statutes explicitly require advertising. See note 154. It is worth noting 
two things at this point: first, speech found to be an advertisement will almost always 
meet the requirements of a statutory or common-law right of publicity claim; second, 
speech found to be an advertisement is less likely to receive First Amendment protection. 
See Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corp, 463 US 60, 65 (1983) (“[T]he degree of protec-
tion afforded by the First Amendment depends on whether the activity . . . constitutes 
commercial or noncommercial speech.”). Therefore, many of the decisions cited conduct 
the inquiry into whether a piece is advertising to determine both First Amendment pro-
tection as well as whether the right of publicity has been violated. This Comment does not 
address the commercial/noncommercial speech distinction, but it is worth remembering 
that finding a post to be an advertisement greatly weakens the speech’s First Amend-
ment protection as well, making the advertising designation doubly important.  
 162 Jordan, 743 F3d at 518. 
 163 Id. 
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Avoiding the visual use of slogans or brand names—both of 
which were factors identified in Jordan—may allow companies 
to increase loyalty without a court finding that a post was an 
advertisement. The Heigl post did not use Duane Reade’s slo-
gans, and Duane Reade’s name was included in the text but not 
inserted into the visual.164 Even under the Jordan regime, the 
lack of Duane Reade’s name and slogans in the visual would 
seem to weigh against considering the post as an advertise-
ment.165 The more attenuated the signatures of a brand are from 
a post, the less likely the post is to be viewed as an advertise-
ment (and therefore as subject to the right of publicity statute). 
However, the Heigl post did “promote[ ] brand awareness 
[and] loyalty” by taking advantage of fans’ respect and affection 
for Heigl, as did the picture in Jordan.166 Although rarely used in 
modern right of publicity cases, this rhetoric echoes back to the 
Supreme Court’s description of the right of publicity in 1977. 
There, the Court stated that the right of publicity is meant to 
“prevent[ ] unjust enrichment by the theft of good will” that a ce-
lebrity has worked to develop.167 This concept of theft of loyalty 
or goodwill cuts to the heart of Duane Reade’s reasons for posting 
the Heigl photograph: Heigl’s fans may become more loyal to 
Duane Reade because of the post. The more that a company ap-
pears to be reaching out to Heigl’s fans, the more the company 
seems to be unjustly enriching itself by appropriating some of 
Heigl’s fan-base loyalty for itself. This follows for almost any 
posting of a celebrity’s image.168 Companies that post photos of 
celebrities are making a plea to fans: “Like us because you like 
and trust this celebrity.” This transfer of goodwill from one entity 
to another is exactly what the right of publicity seeks to prevent. 
The theft-of-goodwill doctrine might seem to swallow the 
rule and turn every statement by a company’s social media ac-
count or spokesperson into an advertisement. However, there 
are important limitations. Most importantly, the advertisement 
needs to be stealing goodwill from someone else. A picture of a 
 
 164 See Stephanie Clifford, Everywhere You Go, a Duane Reade Ad (NY Times, July 
8, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/6WWF-86UM. 
 165 See Butler v Target Corp, 323 F Supp 2d 1052, 1057 (CD Cal 2004) (dismissing a 
right of publicity claim by a band against a retailer for using the band’s song and imita-
tions thereof in commercials, but allowing a right of publicity claim for the allegation 
that lyrics from the song were used as slogans in print advertisements). 
 166 Jordan, 743 F3d at 518. 
 167 Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, 433 US 562, 576 (1977). 
 168 But see text accompanying note 170. 
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tree with the phrase “Happy Fall!” cannot be an advertisement, 
because a company cannot steal goodwill from a tree. The Sev-
enth Circuit has made this point as well, differentiating a mes-
sage congratulating a local community group from a message 
congratulating Jordan.169 A community group is unlikely to have 
the reputation or fan base necessary to have goodwill stolen from 
it. Even some uses of a celebrity may not constitute the theft of 
goodwill, if the uses are not meant to reach out to that celebrity’s 
fans. For example, retailer Abercrombie & Fitch once issued a 
press release asking Jersey Shore star Michael Sorrentino to stop 
wearing its products.170 Abercrombie & Fitch easily defeated 
Sorrentino’s right of publicity suit because it was clearly not try-
ing to promote itself to Sorrentino’s fan base.171 In fact, it was 
trying to disassociate itself from the star. A post is advertising 
only if it is trying to attract fans and use the goodwill that those 
fans have toward the celebrity. Linking and hashtags, two tools 
that are used to reach out to fans and potentially steal goodwill 
from celebrities on social media, are discussed in Part IV.B. 
C. First Amendment Public-Interest Defense and Window 
Dressing 
Companies may be able to claim a First Amendment public-
interest defense if they are accused of violating a celebrity’s 
rights under the Lanham Act or her right of publicity through 
social media posts. Speech, whether or not it is commercial, is 
protected if the publication is a “matter[ ] in the public inter-
est.”172 Although the Supreme Court has never formally recog-
nized this defense against right of publicity or Lanham Act 
claims, it has been a part of these claims among the lower courts 
and in the literature, including in seminal works like Professor 
Melville Nimmer’s The Right of Publicity.173 A company is more 
likely to succeed on this defense if it is able to connect the pho-
tograph to a wider public controversy174 by sharing it from a 
 
 169 See Jordan, 743 F3d at 518. 
 170 See MPS Entertainment, LLC v Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc, 2013 WL 
3288039, *2–3 (SD Fla). 
 171 See id at *13–14. 
 172 Hilton v Cards, 599 F3d 894, 912 (9th Cir 2010). See also Dora v Frontline Video, 
Inc, 18 Cal Rptr 2d 790, 792 (Cal App 1993).  
 173 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L & Contemp Probs 203, 212 
n 60 (1954). 
 174 See, for example, Hilton, 599 F3d at 908 (noting that an “ongoing public contro-
versy” can serve as the basis of a First Amendment public-interest defense). 
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third-party source instead of by posting original content.175 This 
Section first provides background on the use of social media as a 
news source, which may be necessary to persuade courts that so-
cial media can be an information source similar to a newspaper. 
Second, this Section explores the legal distinction between bona 
fide interest in a celebrity’s activities and mere “window dressing” 
uses. The use of sharing to enhance a public-interest defense is 
discussed in Part IV.C. 
Some courts will not entertain a public-interest defense if 
they have previously found that particular speech was an adver-
tisement.176 However, other courts have been willing to take a 
more holistic approach.177 These latter courts may be receptive to 
expanding First Amendment rights on social media. 
First, these courts must recognize that social media repre-
sents a significant source of public information for many Ameri-
cans. In 2014, 71 percent of Internet-using adults (and 58 per-
cent of the general population) used Facebook.178 Over 40 
percent of American adults now get news through Facebook, ac-
cording to a 2014 Pew Research Center study, while 10 percent 
of adults receive news through Twitter.179 And this behavior is 
on the rise at a rate of about 10 percent per year: a 2013 version 
of the study reported 30 percent of American adults reading 
news on Facebook,180 and a 2012 report found that only 9 percent 
of adults said they often used Facebook or Twitter for news.181 In 
2014, Facebook was a bigger source for political news than CNN 
 
 175 An example of generating original content would be paying an employee to stand out-
side Duane Reade’s stores to photograph celebrities and then using the resulting photographs. 
 176 See, for example, Nichols v Moore, 334 F Supp 2d 944, 955 (ED Mich 2004) (“On-
ly the use of an individual’s identity in advertising infringes on the persona.”). 
 177 See, for example, Abdul-Jabbar v General Motors Corp, 85 F3d 407, 416 (9th Cir 
1996). California has proposed nonexclusive “guidelines” for whether a report is news-
worthy, which include “the depth of the intrusion into the plaintiff’s private affairs, the 
extent to which the plaintiff voluntarily pushed himself into a position of public notorie-
ty, the exact nature of the state’s interest in preventing the disclosure, and whether the 
information is a matter of public record,” as well as “any continued public interest in the 
event” and “the circumstances prevailing at the time of publication.” Forsher v Bugliosi, 
608 P2d 716, 727 (Cal 1980). 
 178 Maeve Duggan, et al, Social Media Update 2014 (Pew Research Center, Jan 9, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2SWW-DM39. 
 179 Michael Barthel, et al, News Use on Facebook and Twitter Is on the Rise (Pew 
Research Center, July 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4V8H-NKR8. 
 180 Monica Anderson and Andrea Caumont, How Social Media Is Reshaping News 
(Pew Research Center, Sept 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/W87M-Q2WZ. 
 181 Amy Mitchell, Tom Rosenstiel, and Leah Christian, What Facebook and Twitter 
Mean for News (Pew Research Center, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/EY7D-UHFJ. 
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or Fox; only local television provided more people with news.182 
Perhaps even more importantly, of users who regularly consume 
news on Facebook, 73 percent read entertainment news and 65 
percent read stories about “people [and] events in [their] com-
munit[ies],” compared to 31 percent who read about business.183 
These data indicate that celebrity-related posts are among the 
information the public wants most. 
This cycle feeds on itself on social media: those who are in-
terested in celebrity news are likely to post it, driving their 
friends to read this kind of news. Facebook refers more traffic to 
news sites through links than any other source does, including 
Google.184 One concern may be that entertainment-news web-
sites are not “real” news. Studies have found that entertainment 
news is more likely to come from specialized publications than 
most other types of news, and it is among the types of news that 
are most common on social media.185 Furthermore, entertain-
ment news has long been recognized as news by influential re-
search organizations like Pew, even though it is more likely to 
come from a specialized outlet. Moreover, courts have a long his-
tory of applying the same First Amendment defense to celebrity-
related news as they do to conventional news: the public-interest 
defense. 
Courts have long struggled with the interaction between ce-
lebrities and the public-interest defense, creating an opportunity 
for companies to use the public-interest defense if they are sued 
for celebrity-related posts. For example, California courts have 
stated that “[p]ublic interest attaches to people who by their ac-
complishments or mode of living create a bona fide attention to 
their activities,” meaning that the day-to-day lives of celebrities 
can be considered newsworthy.186 However, California courts 
have also distinguished stories that are actually about the daily 
lives of celebrities (the above quotation comes from a case in-
volving a documentary film about surfers that used archival 
footage of the plaintiff, a famous surfer187) from cases in which 
 
 182 Todd Wasserman, Facebook Is a Bigger Source for Political News Than CNN, Fox 
(Mashable, Oct 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q4VS-HYDK. 
 183 Anderson and Caumont, How Social Media Is Reshaping News (cited in note 180). 
 184 Mathew Ingram, Facebook Has Taken Over from Google as a Traffic Source for 
News (Fortune, Aug 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z9TE-A7KJ. 
 185 See, for example, The Personal News Cycle *3 (The Media Insight Project, Mar 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6TVM-UXLG. 
 186 Dora, 18 Cal Rptr 2d at 792. 
 187 Id at 791. 
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“the context of the communication and the nature of the infor-
mation conveyed” suggest that the use of the celebrity is “illus-
trative” or mere “window-dressing,” with only a “tenuous” con-
nection to the real subject.188 Courts tend to reject the defense in 
cases in which “the names of the individuals were linked to 
products that bore no relationship to those individuals or their 
activities, and conveyed no message other than information 
about the unrelated products.”189 
Posts like Duane Reade’s have an initial advantage in this 
definition because there is a relationship between the product 
and the celebrity’s activity—namely, the photograph suggests 
that the celebrity used the product. A court disinclined to allow 
a company to use a picture of an unrelated professional surfer in 
a beach-themed catalogue may see the use of a picture of the 
surfer wearing that company’s clothing differently. The celebrity 
is no longer window dressing because her relationship to the 
brand, rather than just her celebrity status, is what the compa-
ny seeks to convey to the public. 
Whether courts are more inclined to view a celebrity-related 
post as manifesting a bona fide attention in the celebrity’s activ-
ities or providing famous window dressing may depend on the 
unit of analysis. Assuming the posting of the photograph is a 
one-time incident,190 the natural unit of measurement seems to 
be by the post. However, a few cases have suggested that the so-
cial media account or home page may merit consideration as a 
whole. For example, when the Virginia Supreme Court deter-
mined whether an attorney’s blog posts constituted attorney ad-
vertising or protected speech, the court considered the blog and 
its posts as constituting “an advertisement” (singular), even 
though some of the posts were political commentary and were 
not about cases that the attorney had won (although most 
were).191 A similar intuition may explain why the Heigl complaint, 
which focused on one post, still alleged that Duane Reade’s posts 
“predominantly promote commercial advertisements for a wide 
range of its products and services” and provided examples of other 
posts.192 Since the other parts of the analysis, such as whether 
 
 188 Yeager v Cingular Wireless LLC, 673 F Supp 2d 1089, 1099 (ED Cal 2009). 
 189 Aldrin v Topps Co, 2011 WL 4500013, *3 (CD Cal). 
 190 A post does not have to be a one-time incident. For example, a designer might 
post a series of photographs of one celebrity wearing its designs without the celebrity’s 
consent. 
 191 Hunter v Virginia State Bar, 744 SE2d 611, 617 (Va 2013). 
 192 Heigl Complaint at *6 (cited in note 1). 
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the post was a qualifying advertisement, were conducted at the 
post level, a compelling argument could be made that the post is 
the relevant unit of analysis. A post-level unit of analysis makes 
it less likely that the celebrity will be seen as window dressing. 
After all, the celebrity is the focus of that post even if she is not 
the focus of the entire page. Social media cases are new, so com-
panies should not yet count on either frame of reference—
although framing responses at the post level may help to focus a 
court on the specific post. 
Regardless of the frame of reference, in some sense the public-
interest defense will necessarily be a fact-specific test: it may be 
newsworthy if Heigl, whose foundation is dedicated to helping an-
imals,193 wears a fur coat, while it might be less newsworthy if she 
visits Starbucks. The fur coat may reveal some new information 
about her or educate the public. The post would be more likely to 
be in the public interest if it came in a package dedicated to a 
broader topic—for instance, if it were displayed in a series of 
posts about the hypocrisy of animal rights advocates. The picture 
used by Duane Reade originated in a post on an entertainment-
news website about Heigl’s recent change of talent agency.194 
Tellingly, Heigl did not sue the news website for the use of the 
photo. Heigl likely understood that her change of talent agency 
was a newsworthy story, important to fans and industry execu-
tives. Using a photograph of a celebrity when writing a genuinely 
newsworthy story is a classic protected public-interest use, be-
cause it provides a valuable addition to the story rather than 
mere window dressing for an unrelated story. Emphasizing this 
sort of connection to a legitimate news story through sharing is 
discussed more in Part IV.C. 
IV.  CORPORATE SOCIAL MEDIA SUGGESTIONS: AVOID 
USERNAMES AND LINKING, INCREASE SHARING 
This Part provides three examples of social media fea-
tures—usernames, linking, and sharing—that could sway a 
court’s analysis of Lanham Act and right of publicity claims. Part 
IV.A describes how using social media usernames is likely to trig-
ger Lanham Act liability even if a celebrity’s name is not used. 
Part IV.B explains how linking through hashtags and tagging 
may constitute a theft of goodwill under the Jordan paradigm, 
 
 193 See About (Jason Debus Heigl Foundation), archived at http://perma.cc/8T2A-77XP. 
 194 Heigl Complaint at *8 (cited in note 1).  
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leading to right of publicity claims. Part IV.C discusses how 
sharing can be used to bolster a public-interest defense by 
demonstrating that a celebrity is part of a public controversy 
and not mere window dressing. 
A. Usernames Are a Lanham Act Land Mine 
The lack of protection for photographs under the Lanham 
Act presents an interesting opportunity for businesses that want 
to publicize a celebrity using their products: as long as they do 
not use the celebrity’s name, companies can avoid liability. For 
example, Duane Reade could likely have avoided Lanham Act 
liability if it had not identified Heigl and had instead chosen a 
clever caption like “Guess who we saw today?” For an easily rec-
ognized celebrity like Heigl, using a sly caption is unlikely to re-
duce the impact of the post on viewers. The lack of protection for 
photographs represents a unique opportunity for companies, 
since other aspects of a celebrity, such as an announcer’s distinc-
tive voice, can potentially generate liability.195 Although a dis-
tinctive voice can be a mark, photographs have been singled out 
as an area to which the Lanham Act does not apply.196 
However, usernames may throw a wrench into this social 
media utopia if companies use them. No court has yet faced the 
issue of whether usernames qualify as names that trigger the 
Lanham Act, but it is only a matter of time. For example, the 
Duane Reade tweet named Heigl without using her proper name, 
under which she does business. Instead, it used her Twitter 
username, “KatieHeigl.”197 Lanham Act claims must include the 
use of a “word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof.”198 Intuitively, most readers would say that “KatieHeigl” 
is, in some sense, a variant of Heigl’s name—it would be odd if 
a company could avoid liability for using Tom Hanks in an ad-
vertisement by calling him “Tommy Hanks.”199 Despite not fall-
ing cleanly into any of the categories listed in the Lanham Act, 
 
 195 See, for example, Facenda v N.F.L. Films, Inc, 542 F3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir 2008) 
(“[C]ourts broadly interpret the terms ‘name, symbol, or device’ in § 43(a)(1) to include 
other indicia of identity, such as a person’s voice.”). 
 196 See text accompanying note 142. 
 197 Heigl Complaint at *7 (cited in note 1). 
 198 15 USC § 1125(a)(1). 
 199 Variants that are likely to cause confusion with a mark are subject to the Lanham 
Act. See Kappa Sigma Fraternity v Kappa Sigma Gamma Fraternity, 654 F Supp 1095, 
1096, 1103 (D NH 1987) (issuing an injunction because the defendant used “a chamele-
onic variant of [the] plaintiffs’ federally registered fraternal trademarks”). 
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celebrities’ social media usernames will also likely trigger liabil-
ity for the reasons discussed below. 
A Twitter username can be convincingly analogized to a 
stage name. Like Muhammad Ali calling himself “The Greatest,” 
Heigl chose to adopt the moniker “KatieHeigl” on Twitter and 
can be easily identified by her username. Heigl’s followers likely 
assume that all content coming from the “KatieHeigl” account is 
a message from Heigl herself. In fact, celebrities and scholars 
have begun to identify “brandjacking” and “Twitterjacking”—the 
impersonation of a brand or celebrity on social media—as seri-
ous problems.200 For example, St. Louis Cardinals manager Tony 
La Russa sued Twitter when a user made a fake account in his 
name and posted inflammatory tweets.201 He later voluntarily 
dismissed the suit after the fake Twitter account was shut 
down.202 The La Russa case demonstrates that usernames can 
function identically to a person’s name: actions attributed to 
that username are immediately imputed to the (real or purport-
ed) owner. 
One could argue that a social media username need not be a 
person’s name—Heigl could just as easily have taken the 
username “Katie27” or “kh2007” or some random combination of 
words and letters. A court could hold that a person’s username 
does not qualify for Lanham Act protection, especially if it does 
not resemble her real name. After all, it would be hard to say 
that a username identifies the source of a good if no one but the 
user’s closest friends know who “kh2007” is.203 A username that 
 
 200 See, for example, Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark 
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 Buff L Rev 851, 854–55 (2010) (dis-
cussing “how current federal trademark infringement and free speech law appl[y] to al-
leged brandjacking on social networks”). Lawsuits over fake Twitter accounts or accounts 
that have been hacked have started to proliferate but typically settle. 
 201 See Complaint for Trademark Infringement, False Designation of Origin, 
Trademark Dilution, Cybersquatting, Misappropriation of Name, and Misappropria-
tion of Likeness, La Russa v Twitter, Inc, Case No 09-488101, *2–3 (Cal Super filed 
May 6, 2009). 
 202 See Notice of Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice, La Russa v Twitter, Inc, 
Civil Action No 09-2503, *1 (ND Cal filed June 26, 2009). 
 203 A different analysis might hold true for a user who was famous only in associa-
tion with her username such that it became a symbol for her brand similar to a stage 
name (for example, this may be true of certain Internet comedians who do not use their 
real names). For example, when looking at whether “Here’s Johnny” toilets violated the 
rights of John Carson, who used the phrase “Here’s Johnny” on his show, the Sixth Cir-
cuit wrote:  
It is not fatal to appellant’s claim that appellee did not use his “name.” Indeed, 
there would have been no violation of his right of publicity even if appellee had 
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lacks recognition would not validate the Lanham Act’s purpose 
of preventing consumer confusion about a product or endorse-
ment. However, celebrities are unlikely to create usernames 
that obscure their identities. The value of social media for celeb-
rities is the ability to be easily found and followed so that they 
can mobilize their fan bases at the touch of a button. Further-
more, companies are less likely to link to obscure usernames, 
since they would trigger the desired connection with the celebri-
ty for fewer people. Thus, only recognizable celebrity usernames 
like “KatieHeigl” are likely to become involved in Lanham Act 
suits. 
Even if a court viewed a username as unlike a stage name, 
it could still find a username protected under the public-use doc-
trine. Usernames are typically abbreviated forms of celebrity 
names, which the public can use to interact with the celebrity on 
social media (for instance, by tweeting a message to that 
username).204 Although more vulnerable to challenges than the 
stage name theory, granting celebrities rights in their 
usernames would validate the underlying goals of the public-use 
doctrine. 
The best challenge to applying the public-use doctrine is that 
it is intended to be invoked only when a nickname has been in 
public use for a long period of time.205 Social media websites con-
stantly rise and fall, and celebrities must create new accounts 
each time a new platform gains popularity. For instance, the once-
popular social networking site MySpace went from “exponential 
growth” in 2005 to being surpassed by Facebook in 2008.206 
When new platforms become popular, celebrities must make 
new accounts (potentially with new usernames), which may 
make it difficult for their usernames to gain widespread public 
recognition. Some celebrities find that when they try to join a 
 
used his name, such as “J. William Carson Portable Toilet” or the “John William 
Carson Portable Toilet” or the “J.W. Carson Portable Toilet.” The reason is 
that, though literally using appellant’s “name,” the appellee would not have 
appropriated Carson’s identity as a celebrity. Here there was an appropriation 
of Carson’s identity without using his “name.” 
Carson v Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc, 698 F2d 831, 837 (6th Cir 1983). 
 204 Celebrity usernames are often shortened versions of their real names. In addi-
tion to Heigl’s “KatieHeigl,” consider Justin Timberlake’s “jtimberlake,” President 
Obama’s “POTUS,” rapper will.i.am’s “iamwill,” actress Emma Watson’s “EmWatson,” 
and singer Christina Aguilera’s “xtina.” 
 205 Consider Coke’s twenty-six-year saga. See text accompanying notes 149–50. 
 206 Nicholas Jackson and Alexis C. Madrigal, The Rise and Fall of MySpace (The 
Atlantic, Jan 12, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9TLF-UM5R. 
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new platform, someone has already created an account in their 
name.207 This practice is sometimes called “username squatting,” 
due to its similarity to cybersquatting208 for domain names.209 
Theoretically, username squatting could cause celebrities to 
change usernames whenever they join a new site. In some sense, 
this is a chicken-and-egg problem: If celebrities do not have 
trademark protection for their usernames, they cannot prevent 
cybersquatting and must frequently change usernames. Fre-
quently changing usernames may prevent celebrities from build-
ing up the necessary recognition of their usernames to achieve 
trademark protection. However, if a celebrity had a recognized 
mark in a username, she could prevent pranksters from 
username squatting. In the latter world, in which usernames are 
protected by the public-use doctrine, a celebrity could sue the 
squatter as a trademark infringer. Although this may seem like 
an intractable problem, the answer may be provided by social 
media itself, since terms coined on social media spread much 
faster than conventional nicknames. 
Social media may be changing what it means for a nick-
name to be widely used by the public. At least one scholar has 
argued that “[n]ew forms of social media will increase the rate at 
which consumers accept a new publically coined designation to 
represent existing marks”—that is, that social media makes the 
public more likely to quickly accept a nickname for a product or 
person.210 For example, the rate at which the Oxford English 
Dictionary has added new words has dramatically increased in 
recent years, perhaps due to social media.211 Social media allows 
words and phrases to quickly spread through the population, 
 
 207 This is sometimes the explanation for celebrities including “real” or “official” in their 
usernames. For example, One Direction band member Liam Payne uses “Real_Liam_Payne,” 
while fellow bandmate Niall Horan uses “NiallOfficial.” See Carolyn Gregoire, Funniest 
One Direction Tweets: 20 Weird, Poetic and Generally Awesome One-Liners from the #1D 
Boys (Huffington Post, May 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2JKU-3BYJ. 
 208 Cybersquatting occurs when a person buys a website name that is related to a 
business or person in the hopes that the business or person will want to make a website 
in the future and will pay the cybersquatter a large amount of money to use the website 
name. See DaimlerChrysler v The Net Inc, 388 F3d 201, 204 (6th Cir 2004). 
 209 See generally Zorik Pesochinsky, Note, Almost Famous: Preventing Username-
Squatting on Social Networking Websites, 28 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 223 (2010) (pro-
posing a solution to the issue of username squatting by shifting the focus to the right of 
publicity). 
 210 Gibbons, 35 Hastings Commun & Enter L J at 40 (cited in note 149). 
 211 See id at 41 (noting that the rate of addition has increased from roughly one 
thousand words per year to approximately four thousand words per year and attributing 
that growth, at least partly, to “the growth of social media” and increasing Internet use). 
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dramatically cutting down the time it takes for a nickname to 
gain widespread usage—this is why viral videos can receive mil-
lions of hits in a matter of days.212 Although the time frame may 
differ from older public-use-doctrine cases, social media 
usernames may have the same popular recognition as older 
nicknames. A technologically savvy court may well choose to 
“update” public-use doctrine to reflect this level of usage and ap-
prove a Lanham Act claim based on a social media username. 
Given this legal uncertainty, a company’s best option to 
avoid a Lanham Act claim is to not use a celebrity’s name or 
username in its social media posts. Coy references or asking 
fans to identify the celebrity by commenting on the post will be 
unlikely to fall within the statutory framework, while references 
to a celebrity’s username will likely be seen as similar to the use 
of a popular nickname or stage name. Even posting a photo 
without these references will still enable customers to learn the 
most valuable piece of information: that the celebrity has used 
the company’s product. Even if only some viewers can identify 
the celebrity, the fans who can recognize a celebrity on sight are 
those for whom the post is most important. 
B. Use of Linking Increases a Post’s Audience but Also 
Increases the Likelihood of a Right of Publicity Claim 
Many common social media tools increase the audience of a 
post by reaching out to followers of a celebrity or topic, including 
tagging and hashtags. However, these tools may be considered a 
theft of goodwill, pushing a post into the world of advertising 
that is covered by the right of publicity. Consider first the use of 
tags—using the “@” symbol followed by a person’s username.213 
By using a tag, a company connects the post to another account, 
such as Heigl’s account. This has several consequences, depend-
ing on Heigl’s account settings. The post may become visible to 
anyone who visits her page and may also show up in other sec-
tions of her account. The post may also show up on the home 
page of her followers. Causing a post from Duane Reade’s ac-
count to be shown on Heigl’s page takes advantage of the work 
Heigl has done to acquire a large number of followers. 
 
 212 See Megan O’Neill, What Makes a Video “Viral”? (SocialTimes, May 9, 2011), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/7W9F-ZN7C. 
 213 For a more in-depth discussion of the mechanics involved in this Section, see Part I.A. 
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This type of outreach exploits the goodwill of fans who have 
followed a celebrity’s page in a much more tangible way than tra-
ditional advertisements. Consider the traditional advertisement 
in Downing v Abercrombie & Fitch,214 in which Abercrombie used 
an unapproved photograph of George Downing, a famous surfer, 
in its surfing-themed catalogue.215 The catalogue was sent only 
to Abercrombie-catalogue subscribers, who received the cata-
logue every quarter.216 In contrast, because of tagging, the Heigl 
tweet could be seen by Duane Reade’s followers and Heigl’s fol-
lowers. An analogous situation would be if the advertiser in 
Downing had sent the offending catalogue not just to its mailing 
list but also to Downing’s fan club (even if those people had nev-
er asked to be sold clothes by the company). 
The potential impact of just one tag creates a high-risk, 
high-reward situation for companies that want their posts 
viewed. Even if Heigl quickly removed the photo from her own 
page, social media sites may increase the visibility of the post 
(for example, by bringing it to the top of a user’s home page) if 
the user follows both the poster (Duane Reade) and the tagged 
person (Heigl). This represents a huge gain to Duane Reade. The 
average post by a business is seen by only 16 percent of its fol-
lowers.217 This suggests that about 320,000 of Duane Reade’s 
2,000,000 Facebook followers would see a typical post.218 Howev-
er, if it is also seen by 16 percent of Heigl’s 750,000 Facebook fol-
lowers (at a rate that would likely be greater because the post 
would be placed higher than the average post for fans who liked 
both brands), another 120,000 people would see the post,219 in-
creasing the visibility of the post by 37 percent without Duane 
Reade spending a dime. Although some fans will surely cherish 
this newfound glimmer of information about Heigl’s shopping 
habits, showing this information takes away Heigl’s opportunity 
to profess her true preferences (perhaps she usually shops at 
CVS) and allows Duane Reade into a community it could never 
have entered without the photograph as its ticket. 
Similarly, the use of hashtags (such as the use of “#NYC” in 
the Heigl post) promotes the post to new viewers, further 
 
 214 265 F3d 994 (9th Cir 2001). 
 215 Id at 999–1000. 
 216 Id at 999. 
 217 Drell, Can Promoted Posts Help Your Business? (cited in note 31). 
 218 See text accompanying note 89. 
 219 See text accompanying note 83. 
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increasing its audience. A person clicking on “#NYC” might 
normally see information about the city, upcoming events, or 
even photos of the skyline—but probably would not see a photo-
graph of a movie star leaving a drugstore. Furthermore, there 
are a variety of hashtags that are associated with specific celeb-
rities. For example, the phrase “#tigerbloodintern” was specifi-
cally created by Charlie Sheen for an advertising campaign for 
Internships.com,220 while Taylor Swift promoted her recent con-
certs with the phrase “#The1989WorldTour.”221 The use of a 
hashtag that would be expected to return results that are relat-
ed to a specific celebrity (say, if the photo had been of Taylor 
Swift and the post had included the phrase 
“#The1989WorldTour”) undoubtedly takes advantage of the ce-
lebrity’s goodwill—fans are searching the phrase to connect with 
the celebrity and instead finding a self-promoting post from a 
company. 
Echoes of this issue of pushing into unexpected spaces can 
be seen in the tests for nominative fair use, which require only 
as much reference to the celebrity’s mark as is “reasonably nec-
essary to identify [a] product.”222 When courts apply such a test, 
they are seeking to limit the company’s ability to draw on a ce-
lebrity’s goodwill for its own benefit—and a court will almost 
never find it necessary to use hashtags for the purpose of forcing 
viewers who follow neither the company nor the celebrity to see 
the post. 
Finally, use of a celebrity-picture post as a paid “promoted” 
or “sponsored” post (as Samsung did with Ortiz’s selfie with 
Obama) would almost certainly qualify as an advertisement. (In 
contrast, the advertising space used in Jordan was given to 
Jewel for free.)223 The audience selected when buying promoted 
status could easily be used by a celebrity as evidence of theft of 
goodwill. For example, if Duane Reade’s fan base is primarily 
over the age of forty, but Duane Reade chooses to promote the 
Heigl post to women in their twenties and thirties who like ro-
mantic comedies, it seems clear that Duane Reade is intention-
ally reaching out to Heigl fans. 
 
 220 Piazza, How Much Can a Celebrity Make for Tweeting? (cited in note 47). 
 221 Taylor Swift, CHICAGO, IL Show Added to #The1989WorldTour! (Facebook, 
Nov 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XY5B-DUU6. 
 222 New Kids on the Block v News America Publishing, Inc, 971 F2d 302, 308 (9th 
Cir 1992). 
 223 Jordan, 743 F3d at 511. 
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In sum, although traditional right of publicity cases require 
that an advertisement explicitly propose a transaction, cases like 
Jordan have instead focused on whether the post exploits a ce-
lebrity’s accumulated goodwill with her fans.224 Using linking de-
vices like tags and hashtags reaches out to people who would not 
otherwise see the post based on such viewers’ loyalty to a celebri-
ty or their interest in a topic. The link takes advantage of the 
work that celebrities have put in to grow large follower lists and 
increase the popularity of their related hashtags. In a post-
Jordan world, this outreach may push a linked post into the cat-
egory of right of publicity liability-generating advertisements, ra-
ther than nonadvertisements that do not propose transactions. 
C. Sharing Bolsters the Public-Interest Defense 
A recent article by Professor Daniel Gervais and attorney 
Martin Holmes predicted that “[o]nline uses [of individuals’ 
names and likenesses] and use of celebrities in posts in social 
media are likely to escalate attempts to use the right [of publici-
ty] to bar or restrict online speech.”225 However, companies can 
aggressively use the First Amendment to protect themselves 
against right of publicity and Lanham Act claims and to prevent 
the restriction of online speech. This Section discusses how shar-
ing (rather than creating) photographs can bolster a First 
Amendment public-interest defense by connecting these photo-
graphs to a wider public controversy and thus helping them to 
avoid being seen as mere window dressing.226 
Even if a post is not clearly newsworthy on its own merits, it 
may still meet the requirements of the public-interest defense if 
the company uses the structure of social media to link it to a 
wider controversy. For example, one commentator has suggested 
that hashtags might be used to gauge whether a tweet implicat-
ed a public controversy (by seeing whether other users were 
talking about the subject at the same time or whether they were 
engaged in a conversation with one another).227 Sharing creates 
an even stronger link between the controversy and the post than 
 
 224 Id at 519. 
 225 Daniel Gervais and Martin L. Holmes, Fame, Property, and Identity: The Scope 
and Purpose of the Right of Publicity, 25 Fordham Intel Prop Media & Enter L J 181, 
183 (2014). 
 226 See Part III.C. 
 227 See Patrick H. Hunt, Comment, Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying 
Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 La L Rev 559, 591–93 (2013). 
  
2016] #Liability 499 
 
hashtags do, because sharing more easily demonstrates that the 
specific post was relevant to the controversy. 
One way to demonstrate a public controversy is to use a link 
from another source (such as the photographer’s website) rather 
than uploading the image directly. Using a link, especially to a 
news or paparazzi site, allows an otherwise very short message to 
situate itself in a broader conversation. For example, a California 
appellate court found that footage of a famous surfer was pro-
tected by the public-interest defense when the footage was part 
of one of several segments about surfers in the documentary.228 
In contrast, a California district court found that references to a 
famous test pilot and his accomplishments (which were “wholly 
unrelated” to the defendant’s broader message) in a short press 
release were not entitled to the public-interest defense.229 One of 
the decisive differences between the two cases was that the first 
was clearly situated in a broader public conversation, while the 
second was not. Sharing a link from another source not only 
places the post in context but also may help demonstrate that 
the information began in a news story, helping to debunk the 
misconception among older generations that social media is not 
news media.230 
Beyond the analogy, using a link helps to demonstrate that 
the matter is of interest to more people than merely the two 
primary parties (the celebrity and the company). One commonly 
used test to determine whether a public controversy exists is 
whether the dispute affects some portion of the population be-
yond the parties.231 If a third party originally posted the image, 
and especially if it is a publication of some prominence, a com-
pany can make a clear-cut case that people beyond the parties 
were affected by the news. If they were not, the third party 
would not have originally posted the content. 
 
 228 Dora v Frontline Video, Inc, 18 Cal Rptr 2d 790, 792–94 (Cal App 1993). 
 229 Yeager v Cingular Wireless LLC, 673 F Supp 2d 1089, 1098–99 (ED Cal 2009). 
 230 See, for example, Abdul-Jabbar v General Motors Corp, 85 F3d 407, 416 (9th Cir 
1996) (“[N]o prior consent is required for use of a ‘name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or 
any political campaign.’”). Social media news consumers are “considerably younger” than 
other adult Facebook users: the average Facebook news consumer is only thirty-nine 
years old. Drew DeSilver, Facebook Is a News Source for Many, but Only Incidentally 
(Pew Research Center, Feb 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2Q58-VUZD. 
 231 See, for example, Waldbaum v Fairchild Publications, Inc, 627 F2d 1287, 1296 
(DC Cir 1980) (noting that a “public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the 
public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some 
segment of it in an appreciable way”). 
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A savvy company could take this argument a step further if 
it set up its celebrity-picture posts to simply be “shares” of earli-
er posts, as Samsung did with Ortiz’s selfie with Obama. If a 
picture has already received hundreds or thousands of shares 
(as many pictures of celebrities do), the company’s sharing is 
more clearly a matter of public interest, and the addition of new 
information (for example, the fact that it was taken with a com-
pany’s product or outside its store) might be relevant to the pub-
lic buzz on the issue.232 It also allows a company to set up a use-
ful contrast—the original poster of the photograph has arguably 
also taken advantage of the celebrity’s goodwill or caused con-
sumer confusion. This is especially true when the original poster 
is a news or celebrity-gossip entity rather than a judgment-proof 
individual fan. The original poster provides a likely target for 
the celebrity’s lawsuit, while the company can portray itself as 
simply one among many users who sent the photograph to its 
followers. 
Speakers have long used the presence of other speech or in-
terest in a topic to claim that their speech deserves First 
Amendment protection. For example, in McQuoid v Springfield 
Newspapers, Inc,233 a newspaper published an article about a 
project promoter based on another newspaper’s prior article.234 
The court found that the promoter had to meet a higher stand-
ard in his defamation claim because his conduct had been dis-
cussed in “over 100 published articles, government regulatory 
and investigative scrutiny, [and] politicians’ speeches” and was 
“the subject of the citizens’ daily comment.”235 The evidence of 
prior publications and citizen interest increased the First 
Amendment protection that was available to the defendant. 
Duane Reade could make a similar argument if it showed that, 
like Springfield Newspapers, it had simply been republishing 
another’s story that had already generated public comment and 
 
 232 See Matthew Lafferman, Comment, Do Facebook and Twitter Make You a Public 
Figure? How to Apply the Gertz Public Figure Doctrine to Social Media, 29 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech L J 199, 231–32 (2012) (noting that under traditional public con-
troversy tests, many social media posts qualify as public controversies). 
 233 502 F Supp 1050 (WD Mo 1980). 
 234 Id at 1052–53. 
 235 Id at 1059. See also Wynberg v National Enquirer, Inc, 564 F Supp 924, 928–29 
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interest. Just as courts often take into account the number of 
other publications that carry a story, courts in social media cases 
could look to how many other users have liked or shared a post. 
Similar tests, which look to how widespread the discussion of 
an incident is, have been developed in the context of California’s 
anti-SLAPP236 statute.237 One prominent test defines actions as 
being “public issues” when they are: “(1) statements concern[ing] 
a person or entity in the public eye; (2) conduct that could direct-
ly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants; 
(3) or a topic of widespread, public interest.”238 Posts about celeb-
rities clearly meet the first prong, since they are about celebri-
ties rather than ordinary citizens. The Ninth Circuit has virtual-
ly equated the third prong, widespread public interest, with 
“widespread public recognition” of the subject.239 Even if a court 
resisted the idea that celebrity status could be equated with 
both the first and third factors, sharing a post that has already 
been widely liked or shared could be used as evidence that inter-
est was widespread. Evidence that a topic was already famous or 
widely known is an existing litigation strategy in these kinds of 
cases. For example, one California district court reasoned that 
there had been widespread public interest in a movie because it 
had been commercially successful (My Big Fat Greek Wedding, 
in that case).240 
By sharing an existing picture or post, a company can make a 
more compelling case that it is functionally equivalent to a public-
interest news provider for the purposes of that post. Companies 
that are not traditionally thought of as news providers, such as 
the film company that made the surfing documentary Legends of 
Malibu, have successfully claimed the public-interest defense.241 
Linking to content that was previously posted by another source 
will help prove that there is sufficient bona fide interest in the 
celebrity’s day-to-day activities to warrant First Amendment 
 
 236 “SLAPP” stands for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.” Anti-
SLAPP statutes seek to deter litigation that “interfer[es] with the defendants’ past or 
future exercise of constitutionally protected rights,” especially the First Amendment 
right to free speech. Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary 
of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 Loyola LA L Rev 801, 802–03 (2000). 
 237 Cal Civ Proc Code § 425.16. 
 238 Hilton v Cards, 599 F3d 894, 906 (9th Cir 2010) (quotation marks omitted), quot-
ing Rivero v American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 
130 Cal Rptr 2d 81, 89 (Cal App 2003). 
 239 Hilton, 599 F3d at 907 n 8. 
 240 Kronemyer v Internet Movie Data Base, Inc, 59 Cal Rptr 3d 48, 54 (Cal App 2007). 
 241 See Dora, 18 Cal Rptr 2d at 791, 793–94. 
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protection.242 Referencing the source of a photograph may also 
provide a celebrity with another outlet for her ire, such as the 
photographer or celebrity-gossip site. By being one among hun-
dreds or thousands of accounts that shared a photograph, a 
company can demonstrate that there is significant public inter-
est in the photograph and that it is simply further informing a 
public that is interested in this hot topic. 
CONCLUSION 
The Heigl case and others like it have all settled before a 
district court could even conduct a trial. This may suggest to 
companies that their options are to either avoid posting celebrity 
photographs on social media or face liability. However, smart use 
of social media can allow companies to engage consumers on so-
cial media without fear of liability. By avoiding usernames and 
linking devices like hashtags, companies can avoid liability under 
the Lanham Act and right of publicity regimes. Furthermore, 
companies may be able to take advantage of a First Amendment 
public-interest defense if they share photographs rather than 
generate them on their own. Social media is a valuable tool with a 
broad reach, and companies can make careful use of it in line 
with the law. 
 
 242 See id at 792. 
